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ABSTRACT
ELECTORAL POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES
IN TURKEY
Ergtin, Mine
M.S., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof Hakan Berument
April 2000
There is an extensive empirical literature testing Political Business Cycles 
hypothesis for major developed countries. This study differs from those ones at three 
points. Firstly, this paper is one of the first empirical studies testing Electoral Political 
Business Cycles in Turkey that is a developing country with developing markets and 
institutions. Secondly, the data set includes all the important economic policy 
instruments and indicators, especially the paper uses of extensive budget terms. Finally, 
the literature studies uses annually or quarterly data, but this paper uses monthly data. 
The empirical results provide significant evidence of expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies prior to elections, leading to a significant increase in output growth. 
Moreover, pre-election expansionary policies result as higher inflation after elections. 
Thus, the empirical results suggest that like some of the developed countries Turkey 
has Electoral Political Business Cycles.
Ill
ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’DE SEÇİME BAĞLI POLİTİK İŞ DÖNGÜLERİ
Ergün, Mine
Master, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi; Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hakan Berument
Nisan 2000
Literatürde Politik İş Döngüleri birçok gelişmiş ülke için ampirik olarak test 
edilmiştir. Bu çalışma, onlardan üç noktada farklılaşmaktadır. Öncelikle, bu çalışma 
Seçime Bağlı Politik İş Döngüsüleri’nin, gelişen market ve kurumlaşma yapısıyla, 
gelişmekte olan bir ülke konumundaki Türkiye için test edildiği ilk çalışmalar arasında 
yer almaktadır. İkinci olarak, çalışmada kullanılan veri seti bütün önemli ekonomik 
politika enstrümanlarını ve göstergelerini, özellikle detaylı bütçe verilerini içermektedir. 
Son olarak, literatürde yıllık veya üç aylık frekansta veriler kullanılırken, bu çalışmada 
aylık frekansta veri kullanılmıştır. Ampirik sonuçlar seçim öncesi dönemde gelişleyici 
bütçe ve para politikalarının uygulandığına dair anlamlı kanıtlar sunmakta ve bunun 
sonucunda üretimde anlamı bir artış gözlenmektedir. Bununla beraber, seçim öncesi 
uygulanan genişleyici politikalar, seçim sonrası dönemde yüksek enflasyon olarak 
etkilerini göstermektedir. Özetle, ampirik sonuçlar birçok gelişmiş ülke gibi Türkiye 
için de Seçime Bağlı Politik İş Döngüleri’nin varlığını göstermektedir.
IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank especially Asst. Prof. Hakan Berument for his helpful 
guidance throughout the whole research. I owe a great deal to all my colleagues in 
SPO for their encouragement. Last, I would like to thank my parents, my sister and 
Nergiz for all their endless support. Without them this thesis could not have been 
possible.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................  iii
ÖZET. IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS................................................................................  v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................  vi
LIST OF TABLES...........................................................................................  ix
LIST OF FIGURES..........................................................................................  xi
CHAPTER 1; INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW.
CHAPTER 2: HISTROCIAL BACGROUND AND TURKISH
STUDIES.
CHAPTER 3: DATA DESCRIPTION..........................................................  12
3.1 Fiscal Data.........................................................................................  13
3.1.1 Revenue Terms........................................................................  13
3.1.1.1 Total Revenues............................................................ 13
3.1.1.1.a Tax Revenues......................................  13
3.1.1.1 .al Direct Tax Revenues............. 14
3.1.1.1. a2 Indirect T ax Revenues..........  14
3.1.1. Lb Non-tax Revenues............................  14
3 .1 .1 .1 .C  Other Revenues...................................  14
3.1.1.1. d Central Bank Short Term Advances.. 14
VI
3.1.2 Expenditure Terms..................................................................  15
3.1.2.1 T otal Expenditures...................................................  16
3.1.2.1 .a Non-Interest Expenditures................. 16
3.1.2.1. a 1 Personnel Expenditures.................... 16
3.1.2.1. a2 Investment Expenditures.................. 18
3.1.2.1. a3 Other Current Expenditures............  18
3.1.2.1. a4 Transfers to SEEs Expenditures.....  18
3.1.2.1 .aS Other Transfers................................. 18
3.1.3 Deficits...................................................................................... 19
3.2 Monetary Data....................................................................................... 20
3.2.1 Monetary Aggregates.............................................................  20
3.2.1 Interest Rates............................................................................ 20
3.3 Inflation Indicators...............................................................................  21
3 .4 Output Indicators.................................................................................  22
4; METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION............................ 23
5: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION......................................  27
5.1 Election Effects on Fiscal Policy........................................................  27
5.1.1 Pre-electoral Effects on Fiscal Policy....................................  27
5.1.2 Post-electoral Effects on Fiscal Policy..................................  32
5.2 Election Effects on Monetary Policy..................................................  36
5.2.1 Pre-electoral Effects on Monetary Policy.............................. 36
5.2.1 Post-electoral Effects on Monetary Policy............................ 39
Vll
5.3 Election Effects on Inflation................................................................ 41
5.3.1 Pre-electoral Effects on Inflation...........................................  41
5.3.2 Post-electoral Effects on Inflation.........................................  43
5.4 Election Effects on Output..................................................................  46
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION......................................................................... 48
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................  52
APPENDICES..................................................................................................
A. ADF Unit Root Tests..........................................................................  55
B: Descriptive Statistics...........................................................................  56
C: Tables of the Effects of Elections on Policy Variables and
Macroeconomic Indicators.................................................................  58
Vlll
1 Number Deputies and Share of Total Votes in General Elections........  9
2 The Ratios of Consolidated Budget Revenue Terms to GNP...............  15
3 The Ratios of Consolidated Budget Expenditure and Deficit Terms to
GNP.............................................................................................................  17
4 Effects ofElections on Expenditures in the Pre-Election Period...........  29
5 Hausman F-Test Statistics for Revenues..................................................  30
6 Effects ofElections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period via IV.....  30
7 Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period via OLS.. 31
8 Effects ofElections on Deficits in the Pre-Election Period.................... 32
9 Effects ofElections on Expenditures in the Post-Election Period......... 33
10 Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Post-Election Period..............  35
11 Effects ofElections on Deficits in the Post-Election Period.................. 35
12 Effects ofElections on Monetary Aggregates in the Pre-Election
Period..........................................................................................................  37
13 Effects of Elections on Interest Rates in the Pre-Election Period..........  38
14 Effects ofElections on Monetary Aggregates in the Post-Election
Period..........................................................................................................  39
15 Effects of Elections on Interest Rates in the Post-Election Period........  40
16 Hausman F-Test Statistics for Inflation and Output............................... 41
17 Effects ofElections on Inflation and Output in the Pre-Election Period
LIST OF TABLES
IX
via IV ..........................................................................................................  42
18 Effects of Elections on Inflation and Output in the Pre-Election Period
viaO LS.......................................................................................................  43
19 Effects of Elections on Inflation and Output in the Post-Election
P eriod ......................................................................................................  44
20 Effects of Elections on the Gap Between Public and Private Sector
Inflation in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Periods.........................  46
LIST OF FIGURES
Monthly Increase in Public Sector WPl. 44
XI
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Economic performance has always been an important criterion from voters’ 
point of view to evaluate the performance of the government. Governments that come 
to power through democratic elections usually have incentives to manipulate the 
economy through fiscal and monetary policies to create a favorable economic 
environment for their supporters. Hence, Political Business Cycles (PBC) theory 
argues that the incumbent government aims to influence the voters prior to elections 
with the help of the economic manipulations (see, Nordhaus, 1975 and Lindbeck, 
1976).
This paper aims to find out if Turkish governments applied opportunistic fiscal 
or monetary policies prior to elections to increase their chances of reelection during the 
1987 and 1999 period. The paper further investigates the post-election effects of the 
way fiscal and monetary instruments were used just prior to elections by using key 
indicators of economic performance. This paper differs from the literature studies at 
three points. Firstly, although there exists an extensive empirical literature testing PBC 
hypothesis for major developed countries, there is a serious lack of similar studies for 
developing countries and emerging markets with developing markets and institutions. 
The motivation of the paper is to fill this gap in literature. In fact, this paper is one of 
the first empirical studies that discuss electoral PBC in Turkey -a developing country 
and an emerging market- by making a particularly extensive use of budget terms. ^  
Secondly, this paper uses an extensive data set including all the important economic 
policy instrument and indicators, especially for budget terms. Finally, the data set is
Ozatay (1999) considers electoral PBC in Turkey, but his data set is limited and small.
monthly. The empirical results suggest that like some of the developed countries 
Turkey has electoral PBC.
There are two main strands of thought that discuss the common notion of 
politic intervention into the conduct of economic policy. The first line of thought in the 
area o f politic intervention into the economy is Partisan PBC, initiated by Hibbs 
(1977), dealing with characteristic differences of the economic policies of the 
governments according to their ideological preferences. By this line of thought, 
governments apply fiscal and monetary policies to favor their supporters, and 
economic outcomes such as the level of output, inflation and unemployment fluctuate 
along time as a function o f the party’s ideology in power. However, Partisan PBC will 
not be considered in this paper, because Sayan and Berument (1997) tested Partisan 
PBC in Turkey for the time period 1957-1994, and their results have no significant 
evidence of Partisan PBC. Hence, this study is mainly concerned with the validity, 
within the Turkish context, o f the other line of thought, namely Electoral PBC.
Initiated by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976), Electoral PBC hypothesis 
argues that a strategic incumbent government would like to show a good economic 
performance before elections and would apply expansionary economic policies in order 
to influence the voters and maximize its chance of reelection. Typically, the incumbent 
government is expected to influence the voters by adopting policies to increase output 
or decrease unemployment using the exploitable Phillips curve trade-off. Furthermore, 
the opportunistic manipulations done in the pre-electoral period may have important 
effects on the post-electoral economic performance. For instance, when the rate of 
inflation begins to rise after the elections as a result o f expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies, the incumbent government would try to decrease inflation by 
applying post-electoral contractionary fiscal and monetary policies leading to a 
recession in the post-election period. As a result, the economy would contract and will
be ready for a new pre-election upswing for the next elections. Hence, Electoral PBC 
theory suggests that there are systematic variations at some certain macroeconomic 
indicators, coinciding with election periods.
Empirical studies testing Electoral PBC hypothesis have been carried out for 
major developed counties (see, McCallum, 1978; Alesina and Sachs, 1988; Rogoff, 
1990; Alesina and Roubini, 1992 and Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). These 
studies commonly consider first economic policy instruments such as expenditures, 
taxes, transfers and monetary supply in the empirical analysis and conduct tests to see 
if electoral PBC are applicable to countries in question. Secondly, they consider such 
macroeconomic outcomes as the level o f output or the rate of inflation as the 
indicators of economic performance and test policy outcomes tests with respect to the 
level of output growth, unemployment and inflation. The results of the empirical 
studies, however, are mixed and they provide little or no evidence in support of 
Electoral PBC hypothesis.
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), considering economic policy instruments, state that 
incumbent government reduces taxes or increases government spending before 
elections to be seen as “more competent” than opposition. As a consequence of 
signalling, an electoral cycle arises in fiscal variables, which is called “Budgetary PBC”. 
Although the voters dislike deficits^ (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990), all traditional and 
recent versions of Budgetary PBC claim that an increase in fiscal deficits should be 
observed before elections, because the incumbent government will cheat by applying 
expansionary or loose fiscal policies before elections (Laney and Willett, 1983; Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen, 1997). There is no agreement on the source of this fiscal deficit, as 
either the reduction in taxes or the increase in government expenditures can be the 
reason. Both of these above two policies can be observed simultaneously as well.
" Because, voters do not want to pay the bill of the deficit.
While Alesina and Roubini (1992) find that government spending has a tendency to 
increase and tax revenues have a tendency to decrease before elections, the electoral 
dummies do not turn out to be statistically significant in their analysis. Besides, using 
the US (1960-1993) data, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find that deficits are 
higher in election years, but the pre-electoral dummy is again not statistically 
significant. However, they find significant evidence for OECD countries supporting the 
hypothesis of PBC that the deficit increases prior to elections. They find not only an 
increase in government spending, but also a decrease in tax revenues in OECD 
countries. Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients of the government spending and 
tax revenues are not statistically significant. Furthermore, they test subcomponents of 
government spending as government transfers and social security expenditures, but 
find no significant evidence of Electoral PBC. Rogoff (1990) considers components of 
government spending and claims that pre-electoral signalling will increase the 
government spending and this will lead to reductions in public investment spending, 
because budget cycle will appear as the distortions in the allocation of the public 
resources. However, the voters can recognize of investment spending only with a lag, 
therefore, instead of spending on investment projects, the incumbent government 
favors transfers for programs whose effects are more quickly visible. Ito and Park 
(1988) consider Japan and they find no significant evidence of loose fiscal policy 
before elections.
Laney and Willett (1983) consider US and claim that over the 1960 1976 
period, the federal deficit was related to the presidential electoral cycle and half of the 
deficit was monetized. Furthermore, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) also state that deficits 
before elections are monetised, but the voters can understand the effects of 
monetization on inflation only with a lag. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) consider 
monetary policy and find statically significant evidence of monetary expansion in 
OECD countries, but not in US. While Ito and Park (1988) study Japan and find no
evidence of expansionary monetary policy, Heckelman and Berument (1998) find 
significant evidence of loose monetary policy before elections in Japan.
Alesina (1989), Alesina and Roubini (1992), Alesina, Cohen and Roubini 
(1993), Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) consider policy outcome tests and reject 
the main implications of increasing growth and decreasing unemployment in election 
years. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) test electoral PBC for both the US and some 
OECD countries, but they find no evidence of increasing output growth and decreasing 
unemployment for both cases. Besides, Heckelman and Berument (1998) find no 
evidence of increasing output in Britain and Japan. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) 
also consider inflation, but find no evidence of decreasing inflation prior to elections 
neither in the US, nor in OECD countries. However, they find evidence of increasing 
inflation in the post-election period in OECD countries.
Ito and Park (1988) suggest an alternative hypothesis. Opportunistic Election 
Timing (OET) hypothesis, under election system that has varying election timing. OET 
hypothesis suggests that instead of manipulating the economy, the incumbent 
government can call an early election when the economic performance is good. In fact, 
this is easier than manipulating the economy, moreover, there is no risk of inflation 
after elections. Ito and Park test the implications o f OET for Japan and find that Japan 
is more likely to call early elections when the growth is high. While Alesina, Cohen and 
Roubini (1993) reject OET for all the OECD countries except Japan in their data, 
Heckelman and Berument (1998) consider Japan and Britain and find significant 
evidence supporting OET hypothesis for monetary growth in Japan contrary to Ito and 
Park. They also found significant evidence supporting OET in inflation, but the in 
regression, the coefficient of inflation is opposite to the prediction of PBC hypothesis.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives information about 
Turkish political life and elections, Chapter 3 describes the data, and Chapter 4 
discusses the methodology. Empirical findings are reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 
concludes.
CHAPTER2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND TURKISH STUDIES
Before discussing the effects of elections on the economic variables, it is 
necessary to have a sight at the history of elections and the characteristics of the 
elections. Even though Turkey is parliamentary democratic republic, there have been 
three military interruptions in the democratic process in the history of Turkish 
Republic.  ^Even so, the democratic parliamentary system has been working efficiently 
since the last military interruption in 1980. In fact, before the elections on October 6, 
1983, a military government was governing Turkey, therefore, it did not need to 
manipulate the economy to impress the voters. Besides, there was lack of politic 
competition amongst the parties in this election due to the prohibition of some ex­
party leaders from making politics. When the referendum allowing pre-1980 era party 
leaders to make politics took place (Onis 1997) in 1987, the full politic competition in 
Turkey restarted. Thus, this paper deals with the time period including full politic 
competition and studies on the period 1985-1999 with monthly data. In fact, full 
politic competition is needed to test PBC, because under lack of politic competition, 
the performances of different parties can not be compared in a right way. The absence 
of full politic competition may lead the incumbent government to decide on economic 
policies and outcomes without wondering about the votes he will take in the next 
elections. Therefore, he may not find it worthwhile to show his best performance, 
because he will realize that he has no strong opposition.
There are four elections in the time period the paper considers. The first one 
was on November 29, 1987. The second one was on October 20, 1991. The third and
 ^ The first interruption was on May 27, 1960. The second and third ones were on March 12, 1971 
and September 12, 1980, respectively.
the fourth ones were on December 24, 1995 and April 18, 1999, respectively. The 
competition at the first election, which was also the first election after 1983 elections, 
was mainly between two major parties; incumbent right-wing Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and left-wing Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halkci Parti, SHP). The winner of this competition was ANAP, and ANAP 
has controlled the prime ministership for four years between 1987-1991. However, 
restarting of politic competition resulted as party fragmentation in Turkey'". At the 
same time, high party fragmentation caused big parties to lose their votes. 
Consequently, it became difficult to have a one-party government in Turkey, and the 
era of the coalitions began. Furthermore, the conflicts between coalition parties and 
pressure of the opposition parties that give support to the government cause the life 
of coalitions to be short. As a consequence, in the second election, none of the parties 
managed to get the majority of the seats in the parliamentary, therefore, the new 
government was founded as a coalition by the right-wing True Path Party (Dogru Yol 
Partisi ,DYP) as the dominant partner of the coalition and SHP, the minor partner of 
the coalition. This coalition has controlled country for four years.
The third election took place on December 24, 1995. At this election, the two 
ex-governmental parties lost some of their popularity and new government was 
founded as a coalition by two right-wing parties. Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) as 
the dominant partner and DYP as the minor partner of the coalition. Due to the 
conflicts between the two governmental parties, the government resigned and new 
government was founded by ANAP and Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol 
Parti, DSP) with the support of Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
CHP) and Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Türkiye Partisi, DTP). But, there 
had been some politic scandals that caused the government to resign, and a minority 
government by DSP governed Turkey until April 18, 1999 early elections. The results
' For instance, there were 12 different parties participating in 1995 elections and only 5 of them 
could enter into the parliamentary'.
of the last election were not again permitting for a majority government, therefore 
new coalition was founded by DSP, Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket 
Partisi, МНР) and ANAP. The number of deputies and the percentage of the votes 
parties took in the elections are represented in Table 1.
Table 1- Number of Deputies and Share of Total Votes in General Elections
November October December April
1987 1991 1995 1999
% Number of % Number of % Number o f % Number o f
Deputies Deputies Deputies Deputies
Right of Center Parties
ANAP 36.3 292 24 115 19.6 132 13.2 86
DYP 19.1 59 27 178 19.2 135 12 85
RP 7.2 0 16.9 62 21.4 158 15.4 111
МНР - - - - 8.2 0 18 129
Left of Center Parties
SHP 24.8 99 20.8 88
CHP - - - - 10.7 49 8.7 0
DSP 8.5 0 10.8 7 14.6 76 22.2 136
Note: ANAP (K4otherland Party), DYP (True Path Party), RP (IVelfare Party)MHP( Nationalist Action 
Party), SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party), CHP (Republican People \s Party), DSP (Democratic 
Left Party)
The government has changed after two of the four elections (1991 and 1995), 
and accordingly the economic policies applied by the governments have differed. The 
high election frequency^ therefore, leads to the different applications and priorities in 
the economic policies. Turkish election system is flexible, therefore, the government 
has the chance of calling early election. All the elections, except the one in 1987, were 
early and they were announced approximately three or four months before election 
dates.
There are 4 elections during the 14 years in the concerning time period.
Although the electoral system of each election differs at some stages, their 
characteristics are the same. To be represented in the parliamentary, there was a 10 
per cent barrier for the parties in all of the four elections. In other words, to be 
represented in the parliamentary, a party must take at least 10 per cent of the votes 
around the country. High party fragmentation made it difficult for the parties to 
overcome this barrier, therefore some of the parties made election agreements.^ In 
fact, some old ex-parliamentary parties who did not make election agreements could 
not overcome 10 per cent barrier and could not be represented in the parliamentary in 
1991, 1995 and 1999 elections^
Under the scope of the historical political background, now a recent study will 
be discussed. Ozatay (1999), considering a quarterly data set from 1985 to 1995, 
found some evidence of PBC in fiscal and monetary policies prior to elections in 
Turkey. As monetary instruments he tested net domestic assets and monetary base 
and he found evidence of monetary expansion (in net domestic assets) prior to 
elections. As fiscal instruments he considered total government expenditures and 
other transfers. In fact, he found that other transfers term, increased significantly prior 
to elections. Thus, he concluded that politicians manipulated the economy using fiscal 
and monetary policies. However, he only considered a limited number of fiscal and 
monetary variables. In fact, he did not consider budget deficits or tax revenues or 
personnel and investment spending which are channels for the government to signal
 ^ In 1991 election МНР made an election agreement with RP, whereas BBP (Great Unity Party) 
made an election agreement with ANAP in 1995 election.
’For instance, in 1995 election МНР and ini 999 elections CHP could not enter parliamentary 
because of 10 per cent barrier.
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his competency. Besides, he did not consider about the interest rate as a monetary 
instrument. However, Berument and Malatyali (1998) claimed that Turkish Central 
Bank used interbank rate as an instrument to target M2Y. Besides, Ozatay tested 
inflationary effects in the post-election period due to the expansionary fiscal and 
monetaiy policies done in the pre-election period. Hence, he found evidence of 
increasing inflation in the post-election period. However, he did not consider the post- 
electoral behaviour of fiscal and monetary variables. Finally, he tested if the price of 
public goods and services are manipulated before elections and concluded that the gap 
between the rate of increase in public and private sector prices increased prior to 
elections, although this gap is eliminated just after the elections.
Ozatay considers not only general elections, but also the municipal elections in 
his analysis. But, in this paper it is assumed that the economic policies applied for 
general and municipal elections differ. In fact, general and municipal elections are 
considered separately. However, the municipal elections have no significant effect on 
policy instruments and economic indicators, on the contrary general elections have 
significant effects. The reason can be the fact that, in the municipal elections, the 
allocation of the expenditures of government along the country changes rather than 
the amount of the expenditures. Thus, in the study the empirical results of the effects 
of general elections are discussed.
11
CHAPTER 3
DATA DESCRIPTION
The data set includes monthly data for fiscal and monetary policy indices and 
measures of economic performance such as, inflation and output indicators between 
1985:1 and 1999:5. The first reason of choosing the period is the data availability of 
fiscal and monetary figures and inflation and production indicators are only efficiently 
available after 1985. The second reason is to see the pre-electoral effects of 1987 
elections. Final reason is the existence of full politic competition discussed in section 
2. Monthly data is not generally studied in literature. But, using high frequency data 
increases the number of observations and provides to examine the policies applied by 
the government more sensitively. For instance, suppose there is a significant increase 
in one of the expenditure terms just one or two months before elections. If low 
frequency data (quarterly or annual) is studied, the significant fiscal manipulation may 
not be detected; however, studying with higher frequency data (such as monthly) may 
increase the probability to detect the significance change in variables.
Turkey has been governing by coalition governments for nine years and there 
always exist conflicts between the partners of the coalitions. Consequently, there 
exists high politic instability in Turkey during the time period the paper concerns. In 
fact, the government has changed for three times between 1995-1999, because of 
conflicts between the coalition partners. Thus, monthly data provides to examine the 
economic behaviour of frequently chancing government.
In the following subsections the data set will be described extensively. In 
section 3.1 fiscal data, in section 3.2 monetary data, in section 3.3 inflation indicators
12
and 3,4 section output indicators are described. All the variables in the data set are 
tested for unit roots and the results of ADF tests are presented in Appendix A. 
Moreover, the standard statistical properties of the data are presented in Appendix B.
3.1 Fiscal Data
Fiscal data consists of central government’s consolidated budget with both 
revenues and expenditure terms. All the fiscal variables are used as a ratio of revenues 
in the analysis. The reason of this will be discussed later in section 5.1. Fiscal data set 
is taken from Turkish Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Public Accounts 
Monthly Bulletins and Turkish Central Bank Electronic Data Delivery System 
(CBEDS) including 1985:1 and 1999:5. The revenue and expenditure terms of the 
budget will be discussed in section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, respectively. Section 3.1.3 
discusses the deficits.
3.1.1 Revenue Terms
3.1.1.1 Total Revenues
The revenue terms of the consolidated budget, which are in the concern of this 
paper, are discussed below. The ratios of revenue terms to GNP are presented in 
Table 2.
3.1.1.1.a Tax Revenues
Tax revenues are the major term of revenues. In fact, between 1987-1998, the 
average ratio of tax revenues to GNP is 13.4 per cent, where the average ratio of total 
revenues to GNP is 16.8 per cent.
13
3.1.1.1. al Direct Tax Revenues
Direct tax revenues include revenues of taxes on income and wealth. Direct tax 
revenues constitute approximately half of tax revenues. In fact, the average ratio of 
direct tax revenues to GNP is 6.3 per cent between 1987 and 1998.
3.1.1.1. a2 Indirect Tax Revenues
Indirect tax revenues include revenues o f taxes on goods and services. The 
average ratio of indirect taxes to GNP is 7.1 per cent between 1987-1998.
3.1.1.1. b Non-tax Revenues
Non-tax revenues usually include portfolio and interest revenues of Treasury, fine 
revenues, rent revenues, revenues of sales of immovables.
3.1.1.1. C Other Revenues
Other revenues include revenues from budgetary funds and transfers from 
some special funds.
3.1.1.1. d Central Bank Short Term Advances
Another budget revenue term is the central bank short time advances. To be 
more clear, central bank provides short-term credit with low interest rates to the 
Treasury. The limit of this credit is determined with a ratio of the budget deficit by 
regulations. Although after 1995 new low obligatory limits were set for this term, 
between 1991 and 1996, central bank short-term advances have a significant ratio to
14
GNP; in fact in 1993 its ratio to GDP is 2.7 per cent. Thus, Turkish governments 
made use of this monetarazation term as a budget-financing instrument in that time 
period. Whether there exists significant increase in financing budget by using short 
time advances during election times will be tested.
Table 2 -The Ratios of Consolidated Budget Revenue Terms to GNP (%)
Revenues Tax
Revenues
Direct
Taxes
Indirect
Taxes
Nontax
Revenues
Other
Revenues
CB
Advances
1987 13.92 12.06 5.99 6.08 1.1 1.86 -1.17
1988 13.61 11.02 5.47 1.97 2.60 -0.09
1989 13.62 11.09 5.92 5.17 1.97 2.53 -0.29
1990 14.24 11.43 5.96 5.47 2.02 2.81 -0.39
1991 15.25 12.40 6.48 5.92 1.38 2.85 -0.55
1992 15.79 12.83 6.47 6.36 2.68 2.96 - 1.02
1993 17.59 13.23 6.42 6.80 4.11 4.36 -0.16
1994 19.16 15.12 7.30 7.82 3.89 4.05 -0.51
1995 17.88 13.82 5.62 8.19 3.68 4.06 -0.38
1996 18.04 14.98 5.90 9.08 2.87 3.06 -0.31
1997 19.92 16.16 6.57 9.59 3.44 3.76 -0.41
1998 22.21 17.25 8.04 9.21 4.62 4.96 -0.59
For an incumbent government all the above terms are channels of signalling by 
applying opportunistic policies. For instance, the government can decrease the rents 
of the house provided to employees or excuse the penalties before elections 
concerning non-tax revenues. But, the main concern of this paper is tax, direct and 
indirect tax revenues. Since, they are the dominant revenue terms of the budget.
3.1.2 Expenditure Terms
The expenditure terms of consolidated budget, which are in the concern of this 
paper, are discussed below. The ratios of the expenditure terms to GNP are presented 
in Table 3.
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Government total consolidated budget expenditures mainly consist of 
expenditures and non-interest expenditures. However, interest payments are inherited 
from the past, therefore, they do not reflect the expenditures of government and 
depend on the interest rates, which can not be directly controlled by the government. 
Moreover, interest payments depend on the borrowing strategies and policies of the 
ex-governments. Thus, interest expenditures do not have any implications about the 
policies adopted by the present government, therefore, this paper does not consider 
interest payment expenditures.
3.1.2.1. a Non-Interest Expenditures
Non-interest expenditures include government total consolidated budget 
expenditures excluding interest payment expenditures. Hence, they reflect the real 
current spending of the government, because interest payment expenditures are 
excluded as discussed above. Besides, the average ratio of non-interest expenditures 
to GNP is 15.8 per cent between 1987 and 1998, where the average ratio of total 
revenues to GNP is 21.7 per cent. Non-interest expenditures consist of mainly 5 parts;
3.1.2.1, a l Personnel Expenditures
The large number of governmental workers makes personnel expenditures 
significant for populist policies, because the incumbent government can impress the 
large portion of the voters by making an improvement in their salaries. Besides, 
personnel expenditures is the largest non-interest expenditure term and the average 
ratio of personnel expenditures to GNP is 6.6 per cent between 1987 and 1998.
3.1.2.1 Total Expenditures:
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Table 3 - The Ratios of Consolidated Budget Expenditure and Deficit Terms to GNP (%)
Expenditures Non-Interest
Expenditures
Personnel
Expenditures
O ther Current 
Expenditures
Investment
Expenditures
Transfers to  
SEES
Other
Transfers
Primary
Deficit
Budget
Deficit
1987 17.39 14.37 3.99 2.06 3.52 0.59 4.20 0.44 3.46
1988 16.60 12.75 3.91 1.86 2.76 0.79 3.42 -0.87 2.99
1989 16.87 13.29 5.44 1.79 2.53 0.53 3.00 -0.33 3.26
1990 17.25 13.74 6.66 1.76 2.53 0.32 2.46 -0.51 3.01
1991 20.53 16.74 7.77 1.75 2.70 1.92 2.59 1.49 5.28
1992 20.08 16.43 8.52 1.83 2.65 0.74 2.70 0.65 4.30
1993 24.29 18.46 8.48 1.77 2.66 1.29 4.25 0.87 6.70
1994 23.08 15.41 7.02 1.89 1.87 0.54 4.08 -3.76 3.91
1995 21.91 14.57 6.40 1.82 1.30 0.58 4.47 -3.30 4.03
1996 26.31 16.31 6.50 2.06 1.59 0.34 5.82 -1.73 8.27
1997 27.34 19.59 7.05 2.42 2.17 0.42 7.52 -0.33 7.42
1998 29.12 17.58 7.23 2.45 1.87 0.30 5.74 -4.63 6.91
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3.1.2.1. a2 Investment Expenditures
As mentioned before, RogofF (1990) asserts that investment spending of the 
government decreases before elections. Thus, the total consolidated budget 
investment expenditures will be used to test this assertion for Turkish case.
3.1.2.1. a3 Other Current Expenditures
Other current expenditures mainly include expenditures of security forces 
other agencies.
3.1.2.1. a4 Transfers to State Economic Enterprises (SEEs)
Transfers to SEEs term is significant for the analysis amongst the expenditure 
terms, because most of Turkish SEEs are losing money and can not compensate their 
expenditures, thus a significant portion of the budget is channelled to SEEs. 
Moreover, SEEs are channels for implementation of social and distributive 
government policies. Some of the SEEs buy agricultural products of subsidized prices 
and sell them at market prices, therefore, they are vehicles of subsidizing agriculture 
support policies (see, Atiyas and Sayin, 1998).
3.1.2.1. a5 Other Transfers
Other transfers include transfer expenditures except transfers to SEEs and 
interest payments. Since other transfer does not include transfers for interest 
payments, other transfers term is used rather than total transfers. In general, other 
transfers consist of transfers to social security institutions, municipalities, agricultural 
subsidy institutions, support and price stabilization funds and off-duty losses. All these
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terms are very crucial for the analysis, because they give opportunity to governments 
to apply populist policies; consequently an increase in any of them will be an indicator 
of opportunistic cycle in Turkey. In fact, Ozatay (1999) points out that Turkish 
politicians use social security as a signalling channel and he gives the example of the 
retirement age, which has been changed from time to time in Turkey. Due to the 
unavailability of the monthly data for the subcomponents of the other transfers tern, 
they can not be tested for PBC separately. Moreover, this term is on the average 
second largest term among the non-interest expenditures in 1987-1998 with a ratio of
4.2 per cent to GNP.
3.1.3 Deficits
There are two deficit terms in the consolidated budget: primary and budget 
deficits. These figures will be to examine the interaction of the revenues and 
expenditures at election periods. In fact, the deficits give more information about the 
type o f fiscal policy (tight or expansionary). Budget deficit is defined as the difference 
between government expenditures and revenues and taken as positive when total 
government expenditures exceed its revenues, whereas primary deficit is the budget 
deficit excluding interest expenditures. In fact, as presented in Table 3, Turkish 
budget has been giving budget deficit for all the years in the concern time period, even 
though it usually gives primary surplus in the same period. However, in the two 
election years, 1987 and 1991, the budget gives primary deficit, whereas in 1995 it 
gives primary surplus.
19
in empirical tests for monetary policy, it is not clear to use monetary 
aggregates or interest rates as the monetary policy proxy. In literature, it is common 
to use monetary aggregates as the proxies of the monetary policy, however to use 
which monetary aggregate as the proxy is again not clear. On the other hand, in many 
countries interest rates are used as the main instruments of monetary policy during the 
times when monetary demand changes due to the financial innovations and 
deregulation (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). Thus, in this paper both monetary 
aggregates and interest rates are tested for the existing of PBC not to miss any kind of 
manipulations or their effects.
3.2.1 Monetary Aggregates
This paper deals with 5 different monetary supply aggregates: quasimoney, 
which is the sum of time deposits and liabilities of central bank, reserve money (MO), 
M l, M2, and M2Y, where M2Y is the sum of M2 with foreign time deposits. All the 
monetary aggregates are used as their logarithmic growth in the empirical analysis and 
the unit root tests are presented in Appendix A. Monetary aggregate data is taken 
from International Monetary Fund’s Financial Series and includes time period 1985:1 
1998:10, because of the availability of the data.
3.2.2 Interest Rates
This paper also considers interest rates to test the election effects on monetary 
policy. The data set includes five different interest rates: three-month Turkish Lira 
(TL) time deposit rate, three month United States (US) dollar time deposit rate, 
nominal and real treasury rates and interbank rates, where treasury rate is calculated
3.2 Monetary Data
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as the weighted average of interes7t rates of Treasury auctions at that month. Real 
treasury bill rate is calculated by deflating nominal treasury rate with whole sale price 
index (WPI). These 5 different interest rates are chosen, because, firstly interbank rate 
is an instrument of the Central Bank to manipulate monetary market and reflects the 
short term market rate. In fact, Berument and Malatyali (1998) show that the 
monetary policies of Turkish Central Bank can be evaluated by looking at interbank 
rate instead of monetary aggregates. Moreover, they claim that Turkish Central Bank 
uses interbank rate as an instrument to target M2Y. Secondly, three-month TL and 
US time deposit rates reflect the demand for TL and foreign currency. Thirdly, 
although, treasury rates are not related to monetary policy and reflect only the 
borrowing comforts of the Treasury, they are discussed in this section, due to being 
interest rate.
Interest rates, which are non-stationary, are used in logarithmic groAvths (see. 
Appendix A). Time deposit and foreign currency deposit rates are taken from Central 
Bank Electronic Delivery System (CBEDS) including 1985:1 and 1999:7 time period. 
Nominal treasury rates are taken from State Planning Organization (SPO) Economic 
Indicators including time period 1987:7 and 1999:5, whereas interbank rate is taken 
from IFS including time period 1985:1 and 1998:10, because of the availability of the 
data.
3.3 Inflation Indicators
This paper also considers the effects of elections on inflation. Hence, 
consumer price index (CPI) and WPI are used in this paper to see the effects of pro- 
electoral fiscal and monetary policies on inflation. Moreover, public sector WPI and 
private sector WPI are used to examine the reactions of the two different sectors to
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pre-electoral manipulations. Public sector WPI reflects the price level of government 
goods and services, whereas private sector WPI reflects the price level of private 
goods and services, where, WPI is the weighted average of the public and private 
sector whole sale price indexes. In the empirical analysis, logarithmic monthly growth 
of the indexes are used, because all of the indexes are non-stationary (see. Appendix 
A). The three WPFs are taken for CBEDS, as the WPI calculated by Turkish 
Treasury including time period 1985:1 and 1999:7 and CPI is taken from Turkish 
State Statistics Institute (SSI) including the time period 1987:1 and 1999:5.
3.4 Output Indicators
In this paper, industrial production index is used to examine the effects of the 
manipulations to the economy during elections on output. Industrial production index 
is used a proxy for output instead of real GDP, because monthly real GDP is not 
available for Turkey. Similar to price indexes, monthly growth of logarithmic 
industrial production index is used, because industrial production index is non- 
stationary (see. Appendix A). Production index is taken from Turkish State Statistics 
Institute including time period 1986:1 and 1999:5.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
This paper aims to test electoral PBC in Turkey using the monthly data from 
1985;1 to 1999:5. To test the implication of PBC theory, the following model 1 is 
estimated.
T, = a  + Z  A- + (1) k=l, 2,...6
1=1
In Model 1, policy variable y^ . is assumed to follow an autoregressive process
and this pattern is assumed to be interrupted by elections as measured by the dummy 
term d,. St is the error term at time t, n is the lag order and is specified by looking at 
Akaike information criterion and k is the month the dummy represents*. The primary 
interest of this paper is the coefficient 5  ^ of the electoral dummy dk in this model. In 
other words, the coefficient 5k is tested under the null hypothesis (Hq: 5k=0). The sign 
o f 5k gives the direction of the correlation between election periods and the policy 
variables. Moreover, the significance of 5k gives information about the significance of 
the correlation and provides empirical evidence for the existing of PBC. This type of 
specification is often used in literature (see, McCallum (1978), Alesina and Sachs 
(1988), Ito and Park (1988), Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1993) and Heckelman and 
Berument (1998)).
* In fact, in empirical study effects of elections arc tested for 12 months and the corresponding results 
are presented in Appendix C.
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An alternative methodology to see the effects of elections on yt can be 
estimating the above Model 1 using the sum of the electoral dummies and considering 
the null hypothesis that each of the coefficient of the dummies is equal to zero. 
However, there may exist multicollinearity problem amongst the electoral dummies 
and the policy variable yi in such a model. To avoid such a multicollinearity problem, 
therefore. Model 1 is used for empirical analysis.
In order to estimate Model 1, ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
procedure is used. But, OLS assumes the residual terms are uncorrelated with the 
explatonary variables in order to have unbiased estimates. However, if the explatonary 
variables are correlated with the residuals and accordingly with the dependent 
variable, then simultaneity bias problem will arise, consequently, the estimates yield by 
OLS will be biased. Hence, model will be misspecified and OLS will not be an 
appropriate process to estimate the given data.
In the concern of this paper, simultaneity bias problem may arise if the 
incumbent government calls an early election when the economic performance is 
going good as mentioned in Section 1 (Ito and Park, 1988). Hence, the considered 
cyclic policy variables and economic indicators may influence election timing. As a 
consequence, election timing will not be exogenous and estimating Model 1 via OLS 
will give biased estimates causing a simultaneous endogeneity problem. Ito and Park 
(1988) and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini (1993) suggested different procedures to test 
exogeneity of elections. Later, Heckelman and Berument (1998) used Hausman 
Specification test procedure (1978). To decide on the exogeneity of elections for 
policy variable yi, they include an instrumental variable ctk, in their model and 
consider an F-test to test the restriction 6\=0. This paper follows their methodology
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to test the exogeneity of elections. Thus, the instrument variable, is included in 
Model 1 as:
T, = a  + Z  Piy,-i + Sk-dk + + 7/, (2)
/ = 1
Then, to check whether simultaneity bias problem exists Hausman’s (1978) 
second test is applied under the null hypothesis (Ho=5*k). Thus, if the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, election timing will be exogenous for yt and OLS estimation will give 
unbiased reliable results. However, if the null is rejected, then election timing will be 
endogenous for yt and model will be misspecified leading to give biased results via 
OLS. In the case of endogeneity, the reliable estimates are the ones via IV. In the 
concern of this paper, variables that government can not control directly or has less 
power to control is expected to have endogenous election timing. Thus, elections 
should be exogenous for government spending (Keil, 1988), whereas government 
revenues can be endogenous since government does not have the individual power to 
decide on the level of revenues. Besides, Turkish Central Bank is not considered as an 
independent central bank, thus money supply equations should have exogenous 
election timing. Finally, with respect to spending and money supply equations, the 
equations of economic indicators as output growth and inflation are more likely have 
endogenous election timing. In fact, the results of the Hausman test support this 
intuition. In addition, instrument variable (IV) technique is used to estimate the 
equations that have simultaneous endogeneity problem.
Finally, pre and post electoral effects of elections on policy variables are 
examined using two alternative types of electoral dummies ¿4 and pd^. dk's are
25
constructed such that, they are equal to unity for the month of the election and k  
months before the elections and zero otherwise. The second type of the electoral 
dummies, dpus are constructed such that they are equal to unity at the election month 
and k  months after the elections and zero otherwise.
Meanwhile, as mentioned in section 3, there are some non-stationary variables 
in the data set as can be seen in Appendix A. Therefore, the difference form of the 
non-stationary series are used in the regressions to have white noise residuals.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the empirical results for the effects of elections will be 
discussed within the following subsections. The effects of elections on fiscal variables 
is discussed in section 5.1, on monetary policy is discussed in section 5.2 and on 
inflation and output is discussed in section 5.3 and section 5.4, respectively.
5.1 Election Effects on Fiscal Policy
Model 1 has been estimated for all fiscal variables with the electoral dummies 
defined in section 4 to test the hypothesis that governments apply expansionary fiscal 
policies before elections. In regressions, fiscal variables measured at their ratios to 
total government revenues, because this paper aims to test what is the behaviour of a 
fiscal variable compared with the behaviour of other fiscal variables during elections. 
In section 5.1.1 pre-electoral and in section 5.1.2 post-electoral effects on fiscal policy 
variables will be discussed, respectively.
5.1.1 Pre-electoral Effects on Fiscal Policy
Table 4 presents the empirical evidence of pre-electoral effects on the terms of 
government expenditures.  ^ Government decides on amount of its expenditures.
’ In the empirical study, pre and post electoral effects on policy instruments and measures of 
economic performance is considered for 12 months and the results are presented in Appendix C.
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therefore, it has the opportunity to control them. However, government can not 
decide on its revenues, because its revenues may change due to the factors 
government can not directly control*'*. In fact, simultaneous bias (endogeneity) 
problem may arise for revenue terms and OLS estimates may not be biased. Thus, 
simultaneous endogeneity is tested by applying Hausman tests and in the case of 
endogenous election timing, estimates via instrument variable (IV) technique will be 
discussed.
The empirical evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that government 
expenditures statistically significantly increase before elections and government 
expenditures have the highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing the 
first month before elections. Besides, the empirical evidence also suggests that the 
estimated coefficient for non-interest expenditures increase statistically significantly 
prior to elections and non-interest expenditures have the highest correlation with the 
pre-electoral dummy representing the first month before elections.
Considering the subcomponents of non-interest expenditures; personnel, 
investment, other current expenditures, transfers to SEEs and other transfers are 
estimated separately using Model 1. The empirical evidence suggests that the 
estimated coefficient of personnel expenditures increases statistically significantly 
before elections and personnel expenditures have the highest correlation with the 
electoral dummy representing three months before elections. Besides, the estimates 
presented in Table 4 suggest that investment expenditures, contrary to Rogoff (1990), 
increase significantly prior to elections. Other current expenditures also increase 
statistically significantly before elections and other current expenditures have the 
highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing two months before 
elections. Moreover, our empirical evidence suggest that the estimated coefficient of
For instance, taxes such as VAT depend on the consumption behavior of the agents that 
government can not directly control
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(ransfers to SEEs significantly increases before elections and transfers to SEEs have 
the highest correlation with the pre-electoral dummy representing three months before 
elections. Besides, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of 
other transfers increases before elections, but there exists no statistically significant 
correlation between other transfers and pre-electoral dummies. Although other 
transfers term is an appreciate term for implementing populist policies including social 
security and agricultural and price subsidies, the government does not statistically 
significantly use this expenditure term. On the contrary, Ozatay (1999) finds 
statistically significant evidence of increasing other transfers prior to elections using 
the first difference and real forms of other transfers.
TABLE 4 -  Effects of Elections on Expenditures in the Pre-Election Period
d, d2 d3 d4 ils d«
Expenditures 0.306**
(2.559)
0.195*
(1.940)
0.143
(1.612)
0.051
(0.628)
0.018
(0.235)
0.013
(0.181)
Non-Interest Expenditures 0.278***
(3.516)
0.213***
(3.180)
0.189***
(3.173)
0.121**
(2.182)
0.086
(1.648)
0.096*
(1.938)
Personnel Expenditures 0.042
(1.584)
0.034
(1.529)
0.033*
(1.703)
0.022
(1.263)
0.016
(1.012)
0.016
(1.060)
Investment Expenditures 0.043*
(1.886)
0.028
(1.506)
0.017
(0.995)
0.015
(1.021)
0.011
(0.781)
0.009
(0.663)
Other Current Expenditures 0.014
(1.039)
0.021*
(1.936)
0.013
(1.394)
0.014
(1.639)
0.012
(1.593)
0.007
(1.010)
Other Transfers 0.062
(1.292)
0.038
(0.946)
0.053
(1.513)
0.015
(0.489)
-0.002
(-0.058)
0.005
(0.188)
Transfers to SEEs 0.025
(1.585)
0.019
(1.490)
0.034***
(3.025)
0.026**
(2.537)
0.020**
(2.120)
0.020**
(2.222)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
In brief, the empirical evidence suggests that more of total revenues are 
channelled to the government expenditures. Thus, over all empirical evidence is 
parallel with PBC theory where government adopts expansionary fiscal policies to 
manipulate the economy before elections.
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As mentioned before, simultaneous endogeneity problem may arise for 
revenue terms. Before discussing pre-electoral effects on revenues, Hausman test 
based on model 2 are applied to the revenue terms and the results are presented in 
Table 5. Given our choice of instrument variables, Hausman statistics are significant 
for direct and indirect tax revenues, thus the elections are endogenous for them. Thus, 
OLS estimates are biased for direct and indirect tax revenues.
TABLE 5 -  Hausman F-Test Statistics for Revenues
di dz dj d4 ds de
Tax Revenues 3.704 3.579 3.600 3.641 3.728 4.047*
Direct Taxes 5.731* 4.781* 4.210* 3.90** 4.028* 3.957**
Indirect Taxes 5.100* 11.052* 7.305* 4.684* 4.607* 6.907*
Nontax Revenues 2.972 2.861 3.016 3.173 2.995 3.134
Other Revenues 1.992 2.042 2.039 1.835 1.895 1.942
* indicates 1 % and ** indicates 5 % significance level..
TABLE 6 -  Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period via IV
di di dj d4 ds d6
Tax Revenues -0.062
(-0.521)
-0.032
(-0.391)
-0.025
(-0.349)
-0.036
(-0.565)
-0.038
(-0.560)
-0.060
(-0.811)
Direct Taxes -0.122
(-1.404)
-0.060
(-1.071)
-0.034
(-0.757)
-0.028
(-0.668)
-0.019
(-0.457)
-0.031
(-0.669)
Indirect Taxes 0.276
(0.502)
0.819
(0.568)
0.325
(0.781)
0.057
(0.513)
-0.018
(-0.278)
-0.084
(-1.149)
Nontax Revenues 0.033
(0.208)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.027
(-0.264)
-0.052
(-0.476)
-0.019
(-0.150)
-0.056
(-0.332)
Other Revenues -0.020
(-0.164)
-0.026
(-0.295)
-0.025
(-0.354)
-0.006
(-0.096)
-0.013
(-0.197)
-0.019
(-0.257)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
30
Table 6 presents the estimates of revenue terms via IV” . The empirical 
evidence suggests decreasing direct tax revenues prior to elections. But, the 
correlation between the pre-electoral dummies and direct and indirect tax revenues are 
not statistically significant. Thus, the empirical evidence does not provide statistically 
significant evidence supporting OET hypothesis for revenues of the government.
The results of Hausman test presented in Table 5 suggest that OLS estimates 
of revenue terms except direct and indirect tax revenues are unbiased. Hence, Table 7 
presents empirical results via OLS for the revenue terms in the pre-election period.
TABLE 7 -  Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period via OLS
d, d3 d4 ds d«
Tax Revenues -0.017
(-0.701)
-0.012
(-0.596)
-0.008
(-0.434)
-0.016
(-0.957)
-0.01
(-0.657)
-0.011
(-0.729)
Direct Taxes -0.029
(-1.398)
-0.025
(-1.431)
-0.022
(-1.465)
-0.032**
(-2.402)
-0.028**
(-2.298)
-0.029**
(-2.472)
Indirect Taxes 0.016
(0.833)
0.011
(0.702)
0.011
(0.794)
0.01
(0.814)
0.008
(0.666)
0.006
(0.521)
Nontax Revenues -0.003
(-0.178)
-0.003
(-0.201)
-0.009
(-0.613)
-0.005
(-0.403)
-0.007
(-0.616)
-0.011
(-0.962)
Other Revenues 0.016
(0.652)
0.011
(0.554)
0.007
(0.364)
0.015
(0.928)
0.009
(0.580)
0.009
(0.635)
CB Advances 0.109
(1.308)
0.080
(1.163)
0.044
(0.728)
0.038
(0.690)
0.034
(0.661)
0.029
(0.606)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note; t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
The empirical evidence suggests decreasing tax revenues prior to elections, 
thus total tax revenues and non-tax revenues decrease in the pre-election period. 
However, tax revenues and non-tax revenues are not statistically significant correlated 
with election dummies. Besides, central hank short term advances increase prior to 
elections, but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significantly, either.
" In the empirical study, pre-elcctoral effects on revenue terms via IV for 12 months is also 
considered and the results are presented in Appendix C, Table C3.
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Although, the empirical evidence is not statistically significant for revenue 
terms, it suggests that the ratio of tax revenues in total revenues decrease in the pre­
election period, implying that the incumbent government applies loose revenue policy 
prior to election periods.
Table 8 presents the pre-electoral effects on budget deficits. As a consequence 
o f expansionary fiscal policies, the fiscal deficit is expected to increase prior to 
elections. Hence, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of PBC that budget 
deficit increases prior to elections. Although Turkish budget gives usually primary 
surplus, empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of primary deficit 
statistically significantly increases in the pre-election period. Furthermore, it also 
suggests that the estimated coefficient of budget deficit statistically significantly 
increases in the pre-election period. In fact, both primary and budget deficits have the 
highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing one month before elections. 
The reason of the increase in deficit is the statistically significant increase in 
government spending, since the decrease in tax revenues is not statistically significant.
TABLE 8 - Effects of Elections on Deficits in the Pre-Election Period
d, d2 d3 d4 ds di
Primary Deficit 0.278***
(3.516)
0.213***
(3.180)
0.189***
(3.173)
0.121**
(2.182)
0.086*
(1.648)
0.096*
(1.938)
Budget Deficit 0.306**
(2.559)
0.195*
(1.940)
0.143
(1.612)
0.051
(0.628)
0.018
(0.235)
0.013
(0.181)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coeificicnt.
5.1.2 Post-Electoral Effects on Fiscal Policy
Table 9 presents the post-electoral effects on government expenditures. Thus, 
the estimated coefficient for the total government expenditures increases statistically
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significantly after the elections. Moreover, government expenditures have the highest 
correlation with the electoral dummy representing two months after elections. 
Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that non-interest expenditures of the 
government increase after elections and the estimated coefficient for non-interest 
expenditures statistically significantly increases after elections.
TABLE 9 - Effects of Elections on Expenditures in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6
Expenditures 0.293 ** 
(2.261)
0.312 *** 
(2.781)
0.198 *
(1.916)
0.078
(0.824)
0.129
(1.498)
0.138*
(1.732)
Non-Interest Expenditures 0.267***
(3.110)
0.306***
(4.171)
0.240***
(3.472)
0.148**
(2.261)
0 . 111*
(1.823)
0.077
(1 .368)
Personnel Expenditures 0.006
(0.206)
0.058**
(2.401)
0.048**
(2.177)
0.027
(1.320)
0.011
(0.562)
0.001
(0.083)
Investment Expenditures 0.073***
(3.078)
0.045**
(2.098)
0.024
(1.262)
0.016
(0.913)
0.006
(0.360)
0.003
(0.227)
Other Current Expenditures 0.004
(0.306)
0.015
(J.231)
0.013
(1.267)
0.008
(0.847)
0.005
(0.579)
0.004
(0.465)
Other Transfers 0.104**
(2.056)
0.116***
(2.689)
0.082**
(2.104)
0.053
(1.471)
0.049
(1.467)
0.037
(1.187)
Transfers to SEEs -0.015
(-0.870)
0.002
(0.124)
-0.005
(-0.393)
- 0.011
(-0.964)
- 0.012
(-1.119)
-0.009
(-0.910)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coeificicnt.
Moreover, sub-components of non-interest expenditures behave similar to the 
pre-election period. The empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficients of 
personnel expenditures and investment expenditures increase statistically significantly 
after elections. In fact, personnel expenditures have the highest correlation with the 
post-electoral dummy representing two months, whereas investment expenditures 
have the highest correlation with the dummy representing one month after elections. 
Next, empirical evidence suggests that other current expenditures increase in the 
post-election period, however they have no statistically significant correlation with the 
post-electoral dummies. Contrary to pre-election period, other transfers term
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increases statistically significant after elections. Furthermore, other transfers have the 
highest correlation with the dummy representing two months after elections. Thus, the 
government prefers to channel his funds to social security, price and agricultural 
subsidies after elections to realize his promises to his voters in the pre-election 
period. Hence, in the post-election period expansionary spending policies follow as in 
pre-election period. Finally, transfers to SEEs term is the only decreasing expenditure 
term after elections, however transfers to SEEs are not significantly correlated with 
any post-electoral dummy variable.
In Table 10, the empirical results of post-electoral effects on revenue terms are 
presented. In the post-election period, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
estimated coefficient of tax revenues increases statistically significantly after elections 
and tax revenues have the highest correlation with the electoral dummy representing 
two months after elections. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of indirect taxes is 
significantly positive after elections and indirect tax revenues have the highest 
correlation with the electoral dummy representing two months after elections. 
Moreover, the estimates presented in Table 9 suggest that direct taxes also increase 
after elections but the correlation between direct tax revenues and post-electoral 
dummies is not statistically significant. Next, nontax and other revenues decrease 
statistically significantly with significant correlation with electoral dummies. Besides, 
the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of central bank short­
term advances increases insignificantly as in pre-electoral period. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the ratio of tax revenues to total revenues increases after elections and 
although government continues to increase its spending, it applies tighter tax policies 
the post election period.
34
TABLE 10 - Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Post-Election Period
Tax Revenues
Direct Taxes
Indirect Taxes
Nontax Revenues
Other Revenues
CB Advances
dpi
0.016
(0.592)
0.003
(0.J40)
0.039*
(L945)
-0.013
(-0.617)
-0.017
(-0.625)
0.023
(0.259)
dp2
0.061***
(2.778)
0.035
(1.866)
0.057***
(3.451)
-0.029*
(-1.669)
■0.060***
(-2.730)
0.060
(0.793)
dp3
0.035*
(1.775)
0.013
(0.748)
0.046***
(3.070)
-0.006
(-0.378)
-0.034*
(-1.692)
0.041
(0.613)
dp4
0.024
(1.318)
0.000
(0.006)
0.038***
(2.746)
0.001
(0.081)
-0.023
(-1.251)
0.025
(0.403)
dps
0.022
(1.352)
0.005
(0.400)
0.029**
(2.189)
0.001
(0.064)
- 0.022
(-1.305)
0.038
(0.675)
dp6
0.022
(1.436)
0.006
(0.439)
0.028**
(2.241)
0.000
(-0.012)
- 0.021
(-1.349)
0.037
(0.701)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coeificient.
As presented in Table 11, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated 
coefficients of primary and budget deficits increase in the post-election period. In 
fact, both primary and budget deficits have the highest correlation with the dummy 
representing 2 months after elections. Thus, although the ratio of tax revenues to total 
revenues increase in the post-election period, the ratio of government expenditures 
continues to increase such that budget deficit increases statistically significantly in the 
post-electoral period.
TABLE 11 - Effects of Elections on Deficits in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6
Primary Deficit 0.267***
(3.110)
0.306***
(4.171)
0.240***
(3.472)
0.148**
(2.261)
0.111*
(1.823)
0.077
(1.368)
Budget Deficit 0.293**
(2.261)
0.312*
(2.781)
0.198*
(-1.916)
0.078
(0.824)
0.129
(1-498)
0.138*
(1.732)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics arc reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
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All the regressions above are also performed for logarithmic difference of 
nominal budget terms and the results are similar. But, they are not presented here not 
to occupy much space.
5.2 Elections Effects on Monetary Policy
Model 1 has been estimated for monetary aggregates and interest rates with 
electoral dummies to test the existing of PBC in monetary policy. PBC theory claims 
that prior to elections the incumbent government can manipulate the economy by 
making use of monetary policy and by adopting expansionary monetary policy in the 
pre-election period. However, to decrease the inflation generated by the pre-election 
expansionary policies, a tight monetary policy will be applied in the post-election 
period.
In section 5.2.1 pre-electoral and in section 5.2.2 post electoral effects on 
monetary policy will be discussed under the scope of PBC. In all of the regressions, 
monetary aggregates and interest rates are used as logarithmic growths, except the 
interbank rate.
5.2.1 Pre-Electoral Effects on Monetary Policy
There are two claims of monetary policy instruments; monetary aggregates 
and interest rates. First claim of monetary policy instrument considered in this paper is 
monetary aggregates and Table 12 presents the pre-electoral effects on monetary 
aggregate variables. The results indicate that growth rate of quasimoney, M2 and 
M 2Y  significantly increase prior to elections. They all have the highest correlation
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with the electoral dummy representing one month before elections. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of expanding monetary 
policy in the pre-election. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
estimated coefficient of M l  decreases, where the estimated coefficient of reserve 
money is mixed.
TABLE 12 - Effects of Elections on Monetary Aggregates in the Pre-Election Period
(li (I3 (I4 (I5
Quasimoncy 0.038*** 
(3.037)
0.026**
(2.418)
0.016*** 
(1.733)
0.011
(1.327)
0.009
(1.190)
-0.003
(-0.3919
Reserv e Money - 0.002
(-0.050)
0.002
(0.074)
-0.004
(-0.150)
0.000
(0 .012)
- 0.011
(-0.483)
- 0.000
(-0 . 022)
M l -0.004
(-0.149)
-0.004
(-0.199)
-0.008
(-0.456)
-0.008
(-0.462)
-0.008
(-0.502)
-0.004
(-0.323)
M2 0.032*** 
(2.884)
0 .021* *
(2.292)
0.012
(1.514)
0.012
(1.553)
0.009
(1.366)
0.001
(0.217)
M2Y 0.034*** 
(2.946)
0.022**
(2.331)
0.013
(1.572)
0.012
(1.508)
0.010
(1.399)
0.002
(0.234)
*** indicatc.s I °/o, ** indicate.s 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
Second claim of monetary policy considered in this paper is a set of interest 
rates. Table 13 presents the pre-electoral effects on interest rates. Interbank rate 
might be considered as the monetary instrument of central bank among the interest 
rates to manipulate the economy. In fact, Berument and Malatyah (1998) show that 
Turkish Central Bank uses interbank rate as an instrument to target M2Y. The 
empirical evidence suggests that in the pre-election period the estimated coefficient of 
inter-hank rate decreases, but the correlation between interbank rate and electoral 
dummies is not statistically significant for OECD countries. Alesina, Roubini and 
Cohen (1997) tested long-term interest rates and they also found no statistically 
significant decrease in interest rate. In this study, the estimated coefficients for three- 
month TL and US time deposit rates have mixed results for the period prior to
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elections. However, the empirical evidence suggests that nominal and real treasury 
rate increase prior to elections. The increase in treasury rate can be attributed to two 
factors. Firstly, budget deficit increases before elections and the government has to 
finance its debt by borrowing from the market. Secondly, there is an uncertainty in 
political life, because nobody knows who will govern the country after elections. 
Thus, the uncertainty increases the risk premium in interest rates, so does the treasury 
rate.
TABLE 13 - Effects of Elections on Interest Rates in the Pre-Election Period
(li (l2 dj d4 ds d6
Time Deposit Rate 0 .0 1 4
(0,123)
-0 .0 0 3
(-0.034)
-0 .0 1 0
(-0.124)
-0 .0 1 8
(-0.245)
-0 .0 2 3
(■0.333)
-0 .0 3 6
(-0.538)
U S Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0 .0 5 0
(0.488)
0 .0 0 0
(-0.004)
0 .0 0 7
(0.085)
-0 .0 0 6
(-0.087)
0 .013
(0.197)
-0 .0 1 4
(-0.234)
Treasury Bill Rate 0 .0 1 4
(0.625)
0 .0 1 4
(0.792)
0 .0 0 9
(0.547)
0 .001
(0.076)
0 .0 0 3
(0.239)
0 .0 0 3
(0.207)
Real Treasury Bill Rate 0 .0 3 4
(1.327)
0 .0 3 4
(1.568)
0 .0 3 2 *
(1.674)
0 .0 2 2
(1.222)
0 .0 1 9
(1.125)
0 .0 1 5
(0.926)
Interbank Rate -0 .0 2 6
(-0.572)
-0 .0 2 3
(-0.624)
-0 .0 3 9
(-1 .218)
-0 .0 2 5
(-0.858)
-0 .0 2 0
(-0.745)
-0 .0 1 6
(-0.653)
* * *  indicates 1 %, * *  indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note; t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
As a last item for monetary policy, the monetary equations are not expected to 
have endogenous election timing. Because, monetary policy can be changed at any 
time even when the elections are announced. In fact, the results of Hausman tests 
support this assertion, however they are not presented here not to occupy much 
space. Thus, monetary supply equations have exogenous election timings.
38
5.2.2 Post-Electoral Effects on M onetary Policy
In the post-election period PBC suggests a tight monetary policy to eliminate 
the inflationary effects of expansionary economic policies applied in the pre-election 
period. Table 14 presents the empirical evidence of monetary aggregates in post­
election period. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient for 
reserve money decreases after elections and reserve money has the highest correlation 
with the dummy representing three months after elections. However, in other 
monetary aggregates empirical evidence suggests mixed or increasing estimated 
coefficients after elections. In fact, the monetary aggregates as M2 and M 2Y  
statistically significantly increase after elections. Thus, empirical evidence does not 
support the hypothesis that tight monetary policy is applied in the post-election period 
to eliminate the inflationary effects.
TABLE 14 - Effects of Elections on Monetary Aggregates in the Post-Election Period
dpi dpz dp3 dp4 dps dpfi
Quasimoney 0.007
(0.489)
0.008
(0.723)
0.011
(1.183)
0.009
(1.084)
0.005
(0.657)
0.004
(0.529)
Reserve Money -0.050
(-1.370)
-0.057*
(-1.912)
-0.062**
(-2.415)
-0.023
(-0.969)
-0.032
(-1.483)
-0.046**
(-2.235)
M l 0.007
(0.261)
-0.010
(-0.470)
-0.026
(-1.464)
-0.015
(-0.900)
-0.016
(-1.072)
-0.019
(-1.338)
M2 0.021*
(1.818)
0.008
(0.862)
0.002
(0.216)
0.003
(0.359)
0.003
(0.366)
0.002
(0.345)
M2Y 0.024**
(2.009)
0.010
(0.970)
0.004
(0.468)
0.003
(0.323)
0.003
(0.387)
0.003
(0.457)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics arc reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
Table 15 presents the empirical results for the interest rates in the post­
election period. Interbank rate behaves similar to its pre-election behaviour. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of interbank rate decreases
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after elections, but the correlation between interbank rate and election dummies is not 
statistically significant. For the interest rates, in the post-election period an increase is 
expected due to the possible adopted tight monetary policy and decreasing money 
supply. However, in the post-election period empirical evidence does not provide 
evidence supporting expansionary money supplies. But, it suggests that the estimated 
coefficient of three-month TL and US dollar time deposit rate increases after 
elections. Moreover, TL and US dollar time deposit rates both have the highest 
correlation with the electoral dummies representing two months after the election. 
Although, in the post-election period, empirical evidence does not support the 
decreasing monetary aggregates, it supports the increasing interest rates. Thus, the 
incumbent government manipulated the economy using monetary supply aggregates in 
the pre-election period and using interest rates in the post election period.
TABLE 15 - Effects of Elections on Interest Rates in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6
Time Deposit Rate 0 .0 0 3
(0.241)
0 .3 4 2 * * *
(3 . 733)
0 .2 7 2 * * *
(3.284)
0 .2 3 0 * * *
(2.998)
0 .2 0 1 * * *
(2.767)
0 .1 7 7 * *
(2 .562)
U S Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0 .0 5 4
(0 .514)
0 .3 2 1 * *
(3.925)
0 .2 8 6 * * *
(3.674)
0 .2 3 6 * * *
(3.139)
0 .2 1 8 * * *
(3.056)
0 .2 1 9 * * *
(3 .221)
Treasury Bill Rate 0 .0 4 0 *
(1.881)
0 .0 1 5
(0. 761)
0 .0 0 4
(0 .249)
0 .0 0 5
(0.329)
0 .0 0 4
(0.261)
0 .0 0 6
(0 .443)
Real Treasury Bill Rate 0 .0 4 4 *
(1. 713)
0 ,0 1 5
(0.659)
-0 .0 0 3
(-0 . 149)
0 .0 0 3
(0.134)
-0 .001
(-0.053)
0 .0 0 5
(0 .316)
Interbank Rate -0 .0 3 6
(-0 .814)
-0 .0 2 9
(-0.780)
-0 .0 1 2
(-0.361)
-0 .0 2 4
(-0.822)
-0 .021
(-0.777)
-0 .0 2 0
(-0 .790)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence the estimated coefficient of nominal 
treasury rates increases after elections and nominal treasury rate has the highest 
correlation with the dummy representing just one month after elections. As in pre­
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electoral period, the increase in nominal treasury rate can be attributed to the increase
in budget deficit.
5.3 Effects of Elections on Inflation
PBC theory suggests that inflation is lower prior to elections, whereas it is 
higher after elections due to the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies applied in 
the pre-election period (Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; and Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen, 1997). The electoral effects on inflation are discussed for pre­
election period in section 5.3.1 and for post-election period in section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Pre-Electoral Effects on Inflation
As mentioned in section 4, inflation equation may have endogenous election 
timing, because government can not control inflation directly and inflation is an 
important indicator of economic performance of a country. Table 16 presents 
Hausman test for inflation and industrial production^^. The results indicate that the 
regression for CPI suffers from endogeneity.
TABLE 16 -  Hausman F-Test Statistics for Inflation-Output
(1, (I2 dj d4 ds dfi
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI 9.895* 9.976* 9.869* 9.854* 9.915* 10.072*
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 2.124 2.000 1.937 2.103 2.630 2.600
Monthly Grow th Rate of private WPI 2.715 3.064 1.949 2.049 2.742 2.642
Monthly Increase in Industrial 
Production Index
9.313* 9.158* 10.711* 10.035* 14.605* 14.216*
* indicates 1 % signilicance level.
In Ihc em pirical study, Hausman test for inflation for 12 m ontlis is also considered and the results
are presented in  Appendix C, Table C9.
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Considering the simultaneous endogeneity problem, the equations for inflation 
is estimated via IV and the estimates for inflation is presented in Table 17^  ^ . The 
empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient for the growth of CPI 
decreases in the pre-election period, but the correlation of CPI ith the electoral 
dummies is not statistically significant. Thus, the empirical evidence does not provide 
evidence supporting OET hypothesis for CPI.
TABLE 17 - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Pre-Election Period via IV
di (I2 d3 d4 d6
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI -0.018
(-0.314)
0.003
(0.124)
- 0.001
(-0.025)
- 0.001
(-0.077)
- 0.001
(-0.028)
-0.009
(-0.687)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.030
(0.272)
0.003
(0.104)
-0.003
(-0.122)
-0.007
(-0.292)
-0.005
(-0.244)
-0.007
(-0.341)
Monthly Growth Rate 
of private WPI
0.042
(0.812)
0.023
(0.865)
0.006
(0.222)
0.007
(0.209)
0.001
(0.028)
0.002
(0.099)
Monthly Increase 
in Industrial Production Index
0.198*
(1.868)
0.165
(1.614)
0.182*
(1.688)
0.176
(1.267)
0.261
(1.451)
0.303
(1.220)
*** indicatc.s 1 %, ** indicate.s 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-stalistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
Hausman test results presented in Table 16 suggest that the general, private 
and public sector WPI equations have exogenous election timings, thus OLS estimates 
are consistent. The empirical results of pre-electoral effects on inflation via OLS are 
presented in Table 18. The estimated coefficient for the growth of WPI and private 
WPI are mixed. However, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated 
coefficient for monthly growth of public sector WPI decreases before elections and 
monthly growth rate of public sector WPI has the highest correlation with the 
electoral dummy representing 6 months before elections. Thus, the empirical evidence
In the em pirical study, pre-clcctoral effects on  inflation terms v ia  IV for 12 m onths is also
considered and the results arc presented in  Appendix C, Table CIO
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suggests that the inflation is lower in public sector prior to elections, therefore the 
evidence of lower inflation in the pre-election period is consistent with PBC theory.
TABLE 18 - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Pre-Election Period via OLS
(li d3 d4 ds
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI -0,004
(-0.396)
-0.004
(-0.531)
-0.003
(-0.419)
-0.003
(-0.494)
-0.004
(-0.701)
-0.004
(-0.771)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.000
(0.027)
0.001
(0.093)
0.001
(0.081)
-0.003
(-0.269)
-0.008
(-0.763)
-0.006
(-0.673)
Monthly Growth Rate
of private W P I
0.000
(0.045)
- 0.002
(-0.228)
0.001
(0.085)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.008
(-1.573)
-0.006
(-1.208)
Monthly Growth Rate
of public W P I
- 0.010
(-0.603)
-0,009
(-0.680)
- 0.012
(-0.971)
-0.015
(-L359)
-0.015
(-1.449)
-0.016*
(-1.729)
Monthly Increase in
Industrial Production Index
0.044**
(2 .053)
0.021
(1.214)
0.019
(1 .216)
0.001
(0.059)
0.008
(0.642)
0.008
(0 .706)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
5.3.2 Post-Electoral Effects on Inflation
Table 19 presents the empirical evidence of post-electoral effects on inflation 
and empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of increasing inflation after elections. 
In fact, monthly growth of CPI and private WPI increase after elections, but the 
correlations of both CPI and private WPI with election dummies are not statistically 
significant.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of monthly 
growth of public sector WPI increases in the post-election period statistically 
significantly. In fact, it has the highest correlations with the electoral dummy 
representing four months after elections.
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TABLE 19 - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Post-Election Period
dp, dp2 dps dp4 dps dpfi
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI 0.002
(0.197)
0.000
(0.045)
0.003
(0.416)
0.006
(0.948)
0.008
(1.393)
0.005
(0.914)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.017
(0.993)
0.015
(1.097)
0.021
(1.692)
-0.005
(-0.445)
0.000
(-0.009)
-0.001
(-0.124)
Monthly Growth Rate
of private WPI
0.011
(1.266)
0.006
(0.828)
0.008
(1.340)
0.010
(1.842)
0.008
(1.529)
0.005
(1.019)
Monthly Grow'th Rate
of public WPI
0.023
(1.434)
0.022
(1.607)
0.034***
(2.864)
0.034***
(3.067)
0.030***
(2.831)
0.024**
(2.337)
Monthly Increase in
Industrial Production Index
0.019
(0.875)
0.008
(0.436)
0.023
(1.407)
0.011
(0.734)
0.012
(0.876)
0.003
(0.233)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics arc reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
In Figure 1, the increase in monthly growth o f public sector WPI after 
elections can be detected easily. The vertical lines represent the election times. Thus, 
the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that inflation increases in the post­
election period especially in public sector.
Figure 1- Monthly Increase in Public Sector WPI
• Monthly Increasei n Public W PI
As mentioned before, although public sector WPI decreases prior to elections, 
it increases statistically significantly after elections. Besides, the same behavior can 
not be observed in private sector WPI. Therefore, to examine the different behaviors 
of the two price index, following Ozatay (1999), another variable, gap, is defined as
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the difference of monthly logarithmic growths of pubic and private sector WPI’s and 
Model 3 is estimated to examine the relation between public and private WPFs before 
and after elections.
gap, = a  + 5 ,d ,+ '^ y ,s „ (3)
7=1
where dt is the electoral dummy and Si’s are the monthly seasonal dummies.
Table 20 presents the empirical evidence by estimating Model 3 with both pre 
and post electoral dummies.*"*. The empirical evidence suggests that the estimated 
coefficient for the gap is negative in the pre-election period. To be more clear, the 
growth of the price level of public sector goods and services is lower than the growth 
of the price level of private sector goods and services. In fact, Turkey has been 
suffering from high rates of inflation for 25 years and the incumbent does not want to 
increase the social tension before elections, therefore, it tries to keep the price level of 
public goods and services below the general price level before elections. However, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the estimated coefficient of gap becomes statistically 
significantly positive in post-election periods. Thus, the public sector prices increase 
such that the coefficient of the gap becomes positive after elections contrary to 
negative values prior to elections. Hence, the incumbent government lets the public 
sector prices to adjust to the general price level, therefore, public sector WPI 
increases statistically significantly after elections.
‘"in the em pirical study, pre and post electoral effects on the gap for 12 months is also considered
and the results are presented in A ppendix C, Table C13.
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TABLE 20 -Effects of Elections on the Gap Behveen Public and Private Sector Inflation
in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Period
di d3 d4 ds
Gap Between Monthly Growth 
Rate of Public and Private WPI
-0.006
(-0.501)
-0.003
(-0.247)
-0.007
(-0.743)
-0.008
(-1.027)
-0.004
(-0.493)
-0.009
(-1.252)
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6
Gap Between Monthly Growth 
Rate of Public and Private WPI
0.011
(0.903)
0.013
(1.240)
0.023**
(2 .510)
0.021* *
(2.505)
0.017**
(2.218)
0.014*
(1 .855)
*** indicates I %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level. 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis for the corresponding coefficient.
5.3 Election Effects on O utput
Finally, the effects of elections on industrial production will be discussed. The 
main assertion of PBC is that as a consequence of the manipulations done by the 
incumbent government, output increases prior to elections. However, the 
expansionary pre-election policies may result as an increase in inflation after elections, 
therefore, to eliminate the inflationary effects, a recession is expected after elections. 
This paper uses the growth of industrial production index as a proxy of output growth 
and considers election effects on the growth of industrial production index. As 
presented in Table 16, the regressions for industrial production suffers from 
endogeneity bias’^  and the empirical results via IV for the pre-election period is 
presented in Table 17'^. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests that the estimated 
coefficient of pre-electoral monthly industrial output growth increases prior to 
elections, hence industrial output increases prior to elections. In fact, growth of
In the empirical study, Hausman test for output for 12 months is also considered and the results are 
presented in Appendix C, Table C9.
In the empirical study, pre-clectoral effects on output for 12 months via OLS is also considered 
and the results are presented in Appendix C, Table CIO.
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industrial production index has the highest correlation with the dummy representing 
the first month before elections. Moreover, the significant increase in output growth 
before elections with endogenous election timing indicate that OET exists for output 
growth. To repeat, government calls early elections when output is growing well.
Table 19 presents the post-electoral effects on output. However, empirical 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that recession will take place after elections 
to eliminate the increasing inflation. The empirical evidence suggests that the 
estimated coefficient of monthly growth of output continues to increase in the post­
election period.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to test the electoral PBC hypothesis in Turkey using monthly 
data from 1985:1 to 1999:5 including both fiscal and monetary indices and measures 
of economic performance. Pre and post electoral dummies are constructed to examine 
the effects of the elections on the policy instruments and economic outcomes and an 
autoregressive model is estimated using electoral dummies.
This paper differs from the studies in the existing literature with respect to the 
following points. Firstly, the data set is extensive including all the important economic 
policy instruments and indicators, especially for budget terms. Secondly, the extensive 
data set is monthly. Finally, the literature studies consider developed countries, thus 
considering a developing country to test PBC hypothesis, this paper fills the gap in the 
literature. In fact, the paper finds significant evidence supporting that Turkey, a 
developing country, has Electoral PBC.
Hausman specification test is applied to test the exogeneity of elections timing 
in the autoregressive model and to specify the models. Thus, Hausman test results 
suggest that regressions of fiscal variables as direct and indirect tax revenues and 
economic indicators as growth of CPI and output have endogenous election timings. 
Since three of the elections were early, it may be expected that the government calls 
early elections because o f the well going such indicators and consequently OET may 
exist. However, the empirical evidence via IV suggests that OET exists only for
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output growth, cause only the estimated coefficient of output growth and elections 
have significant correlation with endogenous election timings.
Although OET is present for only output growth, empirical evidence provides 
statistically significant evidence o f electoral PBC in Turkey for various policy 
instruments and economic performance indicators. Firstly, statistically significant 
empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of PBC that expansionary fiscal policies 
are applied prior to elections. In fact, government expenditures statistically 
significantly increase before elections Beside the significant increase in expenditures, 
tax revenues decrease prior to election insignificantly. As a consequence of both rising 
expenditures and declining tax revenues, primary and budget deficits increase 
statistically significantly before elections. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
incumbent government applied expansionary fiscal policies in Turkey in the pre­
election period. Moreover, this result is consistent with other empirical studies in 
literature (see, Rogoflf, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). The interesting point is the 
expansionary fiscal policies continue after elections. In fact, government expenditures 
increase significantly such that, although tax revenues significantly increase, budget 
deficits continue to increase after elections. In fact, the increasing budget deficit in the 
post-electoral period can be attributed as an inheritance from the ex-govemments, 
that manipulated the economy with expansionary fiscal policies, because after the two 
of the elections government in the office changed,. It is necessary to mention that the 
empirical evidence supporting electoral PBC in fiscal variables is much stronger than 
empirical evidence in any other study done for various countries.’’ This can be 
because of the institutional differences in budgetary procedures, as preparation, 
approvation and implementation of the budget, amongst the countries that are 
discussed (see, Alesina and Perotti, 1995).
'' In literature, although expansionat}' fiscal policies are suggested prior to elections, the empirical 
evidence, especially for subcomponents of expenditure and revenues, is rarely statistically 
insignificant.
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Secondly, the empirical evidence for monetary policy is parallel with PBC 
theory where government adopts expansionary monetary policies before elections. In 
fact, money supplies as M2 and M2Y behave cyclic before elections and significantly 
increase, whereas after elections, interest rates have significant cyclic behaviors 
contrary to pre-election period. In fact, TL and US currency time deposit rates 
statistically significantly increase after elections. Moreover, due to the significant 
increase in budget deficits in pre and post election periods, treasury rates increase so 
does the Treasury’s borrowing cost.
Thirdly, the empirical evidence supports the PBC hypothesis of increasing 
inflation in the post-election period. In fact, public sector WPI increases statistically 
significantly after elections. There are three possible reasons of the increasing inflation 
after elections. The first one is that government manipulates the economy with 
expansionary monetary policies such that it chooses its monetary policies so that the 
realized burden of expansionary monetary policy will be realized with higher inflation 
after elections. The second reason is that the inflation increases with the expansionary 
fiscal stimulation done before elections with a delay and that government adjusts fiscal 
stands with higher taxes after elections. The last reason is that the government tires to 
keep the price level of government goods and services low before elections, not to 
increase social tension. However, after elections, due to the first two reasons 
discussed above, the incumbent government can no longer keep the public sector 
prices low, therefore, it lets the public sector prices to adjust to the general price 
level.
Finally, the empirical evidence supports evidence of OET in output equation 
before elections. Thus, the government calls early elections when the growth of 
industrial production index - taken as the proxy for output growth- is growing well.
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However, empirical evidence does not support the PBC hypothesis that output 
decreases after elections in order to eliminate the inflationary effects. In fact, inflation 
can not be eliminated and it increases after elections
The empirical results presented in this paper are generally consistent with PBC 
theory. The empirical evidence suggests that the incumbent government manipulated 
the Turkish economy in the pre-election periods to increase their re-election chance 
between 1985 and 1999.
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A PPEN D IX  A
ADF UNIT ROOT TESTS
Fkeai VatiitM&i' (1) , Bevel ,·: n JDifJfereiiee
Tax Revenues -4.027* -
Direct Taxes -3.994* -
Indirect Taxes -3.709* -
Non-tax Revenues -4.674* -
Other Revenues -4.280* -
CB Advances -3.556* -
Expenditures -6.515* -
Non-Interest Expenditures -5.452* -
Personnel Expenditures -3.737* -
Investment Expenditures -3.471 -
Other Current Expenditures -6.616* -
Other Transfers -4.767* -
Transfers to SEEs -4.089* -
Primary Deficit -5.452 -
Budget Deficit -6.514* -
Mmetar^ Vanahies (2)
Quasimoney 12.870* -
Reserve Money 1.057 -7.625*
M l 1.696 -6.524*
M2 2.873 -3.530*
M2Y 2.785 -3.669*
Reserve Money 1.057 -7.625*
Time Deposit Rate -1.511 -8.019*
US Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0.533 -3.492**
Treasury Rate -1.789 -7.294*
Real Treasury Rate -2.530 -5.263*
Interbank Rate -3.370** -7.341*
TnftMm & Output fmUcatun (2) ■
CPI 1.292 -5.554*
WPI 2.010 -5.268*
Public WPI 1.746 -5.720*
Private WPI 1.882 -5.207*
Industrial Production Index -2.032 -8.314*
(1) All as a ratio to total revenues
(2) All in logarithms
* indicates null hypothesis of ADF test is rejected at 1 % 
significance level
** indicates null hypothesis of ADF test is rejected at 5 % 
significance level
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A PPEN D IX  B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Fhciti Variables (J) Mean Median IVlaxmunii Mlainnnn Sfd. Dev.
Tax Revenues 0.807 0.807 1.147 0.614 0.071
Direct Taxes 0.384 0.380 0.755 0.040 0.084
Indirect Taxes 0.423 0.413 0.925 0.037 0.083
Non-tax Revenues 0.154 0.155 0.510 -0.382 0.083
Other Revenues 0.193 0.193 0.539 -0.295 0.084
CB Advances -0.044 -0.043 0.973 -1.445 0.263
Expenditures 1.275 1.185 2.838 0.644 0.378
Non-Interest Expenditures 0.947 0.894 2.432 0.419 0.284
Personnel Expenditures 0.388 0.366 0.699 0.197 0.114
Investment Expenditures 0.152 0.131 0.699 0.000 0.106
Other Current Expenditures 0.112 0.092 0.598 0.006 0.096
Other Transfers 0.254 0.229 1.059 -0.090 0.139
Transfers to SEEs 0.041 0.027 0.321 0.000 0.045
Primary Deficit -0.053 -0.106 1.432 -0.581 0.284
Budget Deficit 0.275 0.185 1.838 -0.356 0.378
Mmetmy Variables (2)
Quasimoney 5.088 4.822 9.734 1.169 2.469
d(Quasimoney) 0.606 0.599 0.963 0.371 0.136
Reserve Money 3.041 2.849 6.938 -0.329 2.142
d(Reserve Money) 0.044 0.037 0.370 -0.245 0.109
M l 3.877 3.632 7.662 0.723 2.053
d(M l) 0.042 0.043 0.304 -0.258 0.090
M2 5.365 5.106 9.852 1.664 2.375
d(M2) 0.049 0.047 0.182 -0.043 0.030
M2Y 5.997 5.740 10.515 2.284 2.388
d(M2Y) 0.050 0.045 0.176 -0.050 0.031
Time Deposit Rate 0.001 0.000 0.213 -0.212 0.032
d(Time Deposit Rate) 0.058 0.054 0.121 0.027 0.022
US Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.012 0.004
d(US Dollar Time Deposit Rate) 0.492 0.492 1.505 0.008 0.173
Treasury Rate 0.002 0.002 0.175 -0.220 0.051
d(Treasury Rate) 0.070 0.074 0.416 -0.241 0.131
Real Treasury Rate 0.003 0.008 0.184 -0.264 0.056
d(Real Treasury Rate) 0.479 0.495 0.841 0.300 0.114
Interbank Rate 0.002 0.003 0.431 -0.857 0.109
(Table continues on the following page)
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A PPEN DIX B (C ont’d)
in ftu ilon  <6 O utput Indicators (2)
CPI 7.703 7.508 11.270 4.483 2.055
d(CPI) 0.046 0.046 0.221 -0.009 0.027
WPI 7.087 6.889 10.907 3.894 2.159
d(WPI) 0.041 0.039 0.284 -0.045 0.028
Public WPI 7.129 6.912 10.940 3.936 2.158
d(Public WPI) 0.041 0.031 0.439 0.000 0.042
Private WPI 7.069 6.879 10.895 3.877 2.160
d(Private WPI) 0.041 0.040 0.219 ^  -0.065 0.027
Industrial Production Index 4.580 4.580 5.001 4.101 0.200
d(Industrial Production Index) 0.004 -0.002 0.207 -0.218 0.087
(1) All as a ratio to total revenues
(2) All in logarithms and d() represents the monthly 
difference
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APPENDIX C: EFFECTS OF ELEC TIO N S ON PO LICY VARIA BLES AND M A C R O E C O N O M IC  IND ICATO R S
TABLE Cl - Effects of Elections on Expenditures in the Pre-Election Period
d d, d2 d3 d4 ds d6 d? d« ds dio d„ d,2
Expenditures 0.212
(L242)
0.306**
(2.559)
0.195*
(1.940)
0.143
(1.612)
0.051
(0.62S)
0.018
(0.235)
0.013
(O.lSl)
-0.019
(-0.2S6)
0.029
(0.464)
-0.002
(-0.037)
0.006
(0.103)
0.012
(0.200)
0.024
(0.431)
Non-Interest Expenditures 0.188
(1.653)
0.278***
(3.516)
0.213***
(3.1S0)
0.189***
(3.173)
0.121**
(2.1S2)
0.086
(1.64S)
0.096*
(L93S)
0.049
(1.014)
0.060
(1.289)
0.018
(0.397)
-0.005
(-0.121)
0.005
(0.115)
-0.001
(-0.013)
Personnel Expenditures -0.020
(-0.524)
0.042
(1.584)
0.034
(1.529)
0.033*
(1.703)
0.022
(1.263)
0.016
(1.012)
0.016
(1.060)
0.006
(0.392)
0.014
(1.004)
0.010
(0.772)
0.003
(0.252)
0.005
(0.396)
-0.001
(-0.057)
Investment Expenditures 0.034
(LOSS)
0.043*
(1.SS6)
0.028
(1.506)
0.017
(0.995)
0.015
(1.021)
0.011
(0.7S1)
0.009
(0.663)
0.002
(0.181)
-0.001
(-0.061)
-0.010
(-0.885)
-0.012
(-1.118)
-0.008 
(-0.765)
-0.007
(-0.627)
Other Current Expenditures 0.024
(1.314)
0.014
(1.039)
0.021*
(1.936)
0.013
(1.394)
0.014
(1.639)
0.012
(1.593)
0.007
(1.010)
0.006
(0.790)
0.006
(0.929)
0.006
(0.865)
0.001
(0.235)
0.007
(1.172)
0.004
(0.758)
Other Transfers 0.054
(0M9)
0.062
(1.292)
0.038
(0.946)
0.053
(1.513)
0.015
(0.4S9)
-0.002
(-0.05S)
0.005
(0.18S)
-0.008
(-0.319)
0.004
(0.150)
-0.000
(-0.008)
-0.000
(-0.020)
0.002
(0.107)
0.003
(0.126)
Transfers to SEEs 0.000
(0.001)
0.025
(1.585)
0.019
(1.490)
0.034***
(3.025)
0.026**
(2.537)
0.020**
(2.120)
0.020**
(2.222)
0.019**
(2.261)
0.017**
(2.048)
0.016*
(1.920)
0.015*
(1.931)
0.013*
(1.731)
0.012
(1.545)
*** indicates I %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on its lags and 
on only the dummy in the column.
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APPEN DIX C
TABLE C2- Hausman F-Test Statistics for Revenue Terms
d, d2 d4 ds dfi d7 tis d9 ilio du tin
Tax Revenues 3.704 3.579 3.600 3.641 3.728 4.047* 3.832 3.638 3.718 3.347 3.528 3.155
Direct Taxes 5.731* 4.78* 4.210* 3.904 4.028* 3,957** 3.840 3.910 4.290* 5.339* 6.583* 7.770*
Indirect Taxes 5.100* 11.052* 7.305* 4.684* 4.607* 6.907* 8.481* 7039* 10.549* 8.863* 9.824* 8.646*
Nontax Revenues 2.972 2.861 3.016 3.173 2.995 3.134 4.279 3.380 3.590 3.408 4.123 3.272
Other Revenues 1,992 2.042 2.039 1,835 1.895 1.942 1.881 2.233 1.878 3.269 1.656 1.949
* indicates 1 % and ** indicates 5 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the Hausman statistics of the dummy variable in the column for the policy variable in the 
row.
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APPENDIX C
TABLE C3 - Effects of Elections on Revenues in the Pre-Election Period via IV
d, d2 dj d4 ds 6^ d? ds dp tlio d„ du
Tax Revenues -0.062(-0.521)
-0.032
(-0.391)
-0.025
(-0.249)
-0.036
(-0.565)
-0.038
(-0.560)
-0.060
(-0.811)
-0.045
(-0.579)
-0.020
(-0.283)
-0.037
(-0.570)
-0.020
(-0.319)
-0.048
(-0.701)
-0.033
(-0.469)
Direct Taxes -0.122(-1.404)
-0.060
(-1.071)
-0.034
(-0.757)
-0.028
(-0.668)
-0.019
(-0.457)
-0.031
(-0.669)
-0.031
(-0.662)
-0.001
(-0.036)
0.008
(0.238)
0.020
(0.549)
0.035
(0.932)
0.056
(1.097)
Indirect Taxes 0.276(0.502)
0.819
(0.56S)
0.325
(0.781)
0.057
(0.513)
-0.018
(-0.278)
-0.084
(-1.149)
-0,092
(-1.518)
-0.060
(-1.299)
-0.089*
(-1.804)
-0.077
(-1.580)
-0.093
(-1.671)
-0.082
(-1.587)
Nontax Revenues 0.033
(0.208)
0.001
(0.006)
-0,027
(-0.264)
-0.052
(-0.476)
-0.019
(-0.150)
-0.056
(-0.332)
-0.213
(-0.604)
-0.052
(-0.496)
-0.060
(-0.809)
-0.031
(-0.757)
-0.047
(-1.129)
-0.027
(-0.658)
Other Revenues -0.020
(-0.164)
-0.026
(-0.295)
-0.025
(-0.354)
-0.006
(-0.096)
-0.013
(-0.197)
-0.019
(-0.257)
-0.012
(-0.154)
-0.042
(-0.555)
-0.011
(-0.160)
-0.056
(-0.864)
0.019
(0.297)
-0.031
(-0.376)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is 
regressed on its lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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APPENDIX C
TABLE C4 - Effects o f Elections on Revenues and Deficits in the Pre-Election Period via OLS
d d, d2 dj d4 ds d6 d7 ds d9 du d,2
Tax Revenues -0.003
(-0.093)
-0.017
(-0.701)
-0.012
(-0.596)
-0.008
(-0.434)
-0.016
(-0.957)
-0.01
(-0.657)
-0.011
(-0.729)
-0.006
(-0.436)
-0.002
(-0.166)
-0.008
(-0.658)
-0.017
(-1.403)
-0.018
(-1.537)
-0.023
(-2.005)
Direct Taxes -0.010
(-0.334)
-0.029
(-1.398)
-0.025
(-1.431)
-0.022
(-1.465)
-0.032**
(-2.402)
-0.028**
(-2.298)
-0.029**
(-2.472)
-0.021*
(-1.848)
-0.015
(-1.368)
-0.017
(-1.614)
-0.023
(-2.320)**
-0.02
(-2.134)**
-0.024
(-2.606)**
Indirect Taxes 0.022(0.825)
0.016
(0.833)
0.011
(0.702)
0.011
(0.794)
0.01
(0.814)
0.008
(0.666)
0.006
(0.521)
0.001
(0.118)
0.003
(0.297) 0.001(0.123)
0.002
(0.261)
0.000
(0.014)
-0.002
(-0.202)
Nontax Revenues -0.011
(-0.398)
-0.003
(-0.178)
-0.003
(-0.201)
-0.009
(-0.613)
-0.005
(-0.403)
-0.007
(-0.616)
-0.011
(-0.962)
-0.013
(-1.214)
-0.014
(-1.386)
-0.008
(-0.856)
-0.002
(-0.223)
-0.006
(-0.641)
-0.001
(-0.075)
Other Revenues 0.001
(0.028)
0.016
(0.652)
0.011
(0.554)
0.007
(0.364)
0.015
(0.928)
0.009
(0.580)
0.009
(0.635)
0.005
(0.361)
0.001
(0.087)
0.008
(0.598)
0.016
(1.303)
0.017
(1.439)
0.022
(1.906)*
CB Advances 0.139
(1.194)
0.109
(1.308)
0.080
(1.163)
0.044
(0.728)
0.038
(0.690)
0.034
(0.661)
0.029
(0.606)
0.036
(0.793)
0.040
(0.915)
0.038
(0.897)
0.034
(0.836)
0.025
(0.634)
0.030
(0.768)
Primary Deficit 0.188
(1.653)
0.278***
(3.516)
0.213***
(3.180)
0.189***
(3.173)
0.121**
(2.182)
0.086*
(1.648)
0.096*
(1.938)
0.049
(1.014)
0.060
(1.289)
0.018
(0.397)
-0.005
(-0.121)
0.005
(0.115)
-0.001
(-0.013)
Budget Deficit 0.212
(1.242)
0.306**
(2.559)
0.195*
(1.940)
0.143
(1.612)
0.051
(0.628)
0.018
(0.235)
0.013
(0.181)
-0.019
(-0.286)
0.029
(0.464)
-0.002
(-0.037)
0.006
(0.103)
0.012
(0.200)
0.024
(0.431)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, w here the policy variable in the row is regressed on 
itslags and on only the dummy in the column.
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APPEN DIX C
TABLE C5 - Effects o f Elections on Expenditures in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6 dp7 dps dp. dpio dpn dpt2
Expenditures 0.293 ** 
(2.261)
0.312 ***
(2.781)
0.198 * 
(1.916)
0.078
(0.824)
0.129
(1.498)
0.138*
(1.732)
0.158**
(2.121)
0.145**
(2.053)
0.132*
(1.960)
0.123*
(1.894)
0.074
(1.187)
0.110*
(1.818)
Non-Interest Expenditures 0.267***(3.110)
0.306***
(4.171)
0.240***
(3.472)
0.148**
(2.261)
0.111*
(1.823)
0.077
(1.368)
0.094*
(1.809)
0.106**
(2.194)
0.094**
(2.053)
0.089**
(2.043)
0.057
(1.343)
0.079*
(1.945)
Personnel Expenditures 0.006
(0.206)
0.058**
(2.401)
0.048**
(2.177)
0.027
(1.320)
0.011
(0.562)
0.001
(0.083)
0.006
(0.366)
0.011
(0.703)
0.009
(0.611)
0.009
(0.650)
0.002
(0.119)
0.004
(0.276)
Investment Expenditures 0.073***(3.078)
0.045**
(2.098)
0.024
(1.262)
0.016
(0.913)
0.006
(0.360)
0.003
(0.227)
0.009
(0.665)
0.010
(0.782)
0.011
(0.883)
0.015
(1.240)
0.006
(0.520)
0.010
(0.910)
Other Current Expenditures 0.004
(0.306)
0.015
(1.231)
0.013
(1.267)
0.008
(0.847)
0.005
(0.579)
0.004
(0.465)
0.004
(0.461)
0.004
(0.559)
0.008
(1.082)
0.006
(0.818)
0.007
(1.093)
0.007
(1.099)
Other Transfers 0.104**
(2.056)
0.116***
(2.689)
0.082**
(2.104)
0.053
(1.471)
0.049
(1.467)
0.037
(1.187)
0.043
(1.487)
0.044
(1.605)
0.036
(1.381)
0.026
(1.035)
0.017
(0.676)
0.028
(1.192)
Transfers to SEEs -0.015
(-0.870)
0.002
(0.124)
-0.005
(-0.393)
-0.011
(-0.964)
-0.012
(-1.119)
-0.009
(-0.910)
-0.009
(-0.930)
-0.006
(-0.657)
-0.005
(-0.566)
-0.004
(-0.444)
-0.004
(-0.496)
-0.004
(-0.515)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row' is regressed on its 
lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C6 - Effects of Elections on Revenues and Deficits in the Post-Election Period
d p i ( lp 2 d p 3 (IP 4 dps dp« d p 7 d p s d p 9 dpio dpii dpi2
Tax Revenues 0.016
(0.592)
0.061***
(2.778)
0.035*
(1.775)
0.024
(1.318)
0.022
(1.352)
0.022
(1.436)
0.024
(1.615)
0.026*
(1.821)
0.025*
(1.814)
0.025*
(1,850)
0.018
(1.386)
0.021*
(1.696)
Direct Taxes 0.003(0.140)
0.035
(1.866)
0.013
(0.748)
0.000
(0.006)
0,005
(0.400)
0.006
(0.439)
0.012
(1.006)
0.010
(0.842)
0.011
(0.954)
0.010
(0.914)
0.005
(0.483)
0.003
(0.344)
Indirect Taxes 0.039*
(1.945)
0.057***
(3.451)
0.046***
(3.070)
0.038***
(2.746)
0.029**
(2.189)
0.028**
(2.241)
0.021**
(1.806)
0.022*
(1.945)
0.020*
(1,841)
0.022**
(2.128)
0.019*
(1.909)
0.023**
(2.424)
Nontax Revenues -0.013(-0.617)
-0.029*
(-1.669)
-0.006
(-0.378)
0.001
(0.081)
0.001
(0.064)
0.000
(-0.012)
-0.002
(-0.173)
-0.001
(-0.089)
-0.002
(-0.189)
-0.004
(-0.355)
0.003
(0.275)
0.003
(0.330)
Other Revenues -0.017
(-0.625)
-0.060***
(-2.730)
-0.034*
(-1.692)
-0.023
(-1.251)
-0.022
(-1.305)
-0.021
(-1.349)
-0.024
(-1.588)
-0.025*
(-1.752)
-0.024*
(-1.750)
-0.025*
(-1.844)
-0.017
(-1.340)
-0.020
(-1.603)
CB Advances 0.023(0.259)
0.060
(0.793)
0.041
(0.613)
0.025
(0.403)
0.038
(0.675)
0.037
(0.701)
0.040
(0.785)
0.022
(0.459)
-0.003
(-0.068)
-0.021
(-0.477)
-0.014
(-0.326)
-0.012
(-0.295)
Primary Deficit 0 267*** (3.110)
0.306***
(4.171)
0.240***
(3.472)
0.148**
(2.261)
0.111*
(1.823)
0.077
(1.368)
0.094*
(1.809)
0.106**
(2.194)
0.094**
(2,053)
0.089**
(2.043)
0.057
(1.343)
0.079*
(1.945)
Budget Deficit 0.293**
(2.261)
0.312*
(2.781)
0.198*
(-1.916)
0.078
(0.824)
0.129
(1.498)
0.138*
(1.732)
0.158**
(2.121)
0.145**
(2.053)
0.132*
(1.960)
0.123*
(1.894)
0.074
(1.187)
0.110*
(1.818)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is 
regressed on its lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C7 - Effects of Elections on Monetary Policy in the Pre-Election Period
(1 cl, Cl2 (1з tl4 (Is (1б (l7 els (I9 dio (In (1,2
Quasinioney 0.034***
(1.897)
0.038***
(3.037)
0.026**
(2.418)
0.016***
(1.733)
0.011
(1.327)
0.009
(1.190)
-0.003
(-0.3919
0.002
(0.268)
0.002
(0.280)
0.000
(0.057)
-0.000
(-0.044)
-0.002
(-0.349)
0.000
(0.084)
R cscr\e Money -0.009
(-0.164)
-0.002
(-0.050)
0.002
(0.074)
-0.004
(-0.150)
0.000
(0.012)
-0.011
(-0.483)
-0.000
(-0.022)
-0.021
(-1.111)
-0.017
(-0.990)
0.000
(0.006)
0.006
(0.380)
-0.003
(-0.185)
-0.006
(-0.384)
M l -0.015
(-0.439)
-0.004
(-0.149)
-0.004
(-0.199)
-0.008
(-0.456)
-0.008
(-0.462)
-0.008
(-0.502)
-0.004
(-0.323)
-0.014
(-1.069)
-0.013
(-1.038)
-0.010
(-0.865)
-0.000
(-0.040)
0.000
(0.004)
0.000
(0.002)
M2 0.032**(2.040)
0.032***
(2.884)
0.021**
(2.292)
0.012
(1.514)
0.012
(1.553)
0.009
(1.366)
0.001
(0.217)
0.003
(0.493)
-0.001
-0.092
-0.002
(-0.413)
-0.001
(-0.270)
-0.001
(-0.274)
0.001
(0.114)
M2Y 0.034**(2.067)
0.034***
(2.946)
0.022**
(2.331)
0.013
(1.572)
0.012
(1.508)
0.010
(1.399)
0.002
(0.234)
0.004
(0.706)
0.001
(0.188)
-0.002
(-0.379)
-0.002
(-0.397)
-0.002
(-0.339)
0.001
(0.185)
Time Deposit Rate 0.045(0.276)
0.014
(0.123)
-0.003
(-0.034)
-0.010
(-0.124)
-0.018
(-0.245)
-0.023
(-0.333)
-0.036
(-0.538)
-0.031
(-0.496)
-0.022
(-0.371)
-0.020
(-0.340)
-0.028
(-0.482)
-0.036
(-0.646)
-0.034
(-0.625)
U S  Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0.030(0.209)
0.050
(0.488)
0.000
(-0.004)
0.007
(0.085)
-0.006
(-0.087)
0.013
(0.197)
-0.014
(-0.234)
-0.016
(-0.278)
-0.042
(-0.746)
-0.043
(-0.795)
-0.041
(-0.769)
-0.035
(-0.672)
-0.059
(-1.173)
Treasury Bill Rate 0.038
(1.257)
0.014
(0.625)
0.014
(0.792)
0.009
(0.547)
0.001
(0.076)
0.003
(0.239)
0.003
(0.207)
0.014
(1.166)
0.010
(0.832)
0.006
(0.562)
0.004
(0.344)
0.002
(0.235)
0.000
(-0.047)
Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.050
(1.464)
0.034
(1.327)
0.034
(1.568)
0.032*
(1.674)
0.022
(1.222)
0.019
(1.125)
0.015
(0.926)
0.031**
(2.094)
0.037**
(2.579)
0.034**
(2.493)
0.032**
(2.509)
0.032**
(2.607)
0.026**
(2.235)
Interbank Rate -0.049
(-0.780)
-0.026
(-0.572)
-0.023
(-0.624)
-0.039
(-1.218)
-0.025
(-0.858)
-0.020
(-0.745)
-0.016
(-0.653)
-0.017
(-0.710)
-0.015
(-0.642)
-0.012
(-0.541)
-0.013
(-0.633)
-0.010
(-0.506)
-0.009
(-0.447)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on its lags and 
on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C8 - Effects of Elections on Monetai^ Policy in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dp6 dp7 dps dp. dpio dpii dpi2
Quasimoncy 0.007
(0.489)
0.008
(0.723)
0.011
(1.183)
0.009
(1.084)
0.005
(0.657)
0.004
(0.529)
0.003
(0.493)
0.004
(0.621)
0.006
(1.002)
0.009
(1.486)
0.009
(1.499)
0.010*
(1.815)
Reserve Money -0.050
(-1.370)
-0.057*
(-1.912)
-0.062**
(-2.415)
-0.023
(-0.969)
-0.032
(-1.483)
-0.046**
(-2.235)
-0.036***
(-1.866)
-0.026
(-1.362)
-0.021
(-1.143)
-0.020
(-1.168)
-0.023
(-1.375)
-0.022
(-1.346)
M l 0.007
(0.261)
-0.010
(-0.470)
-0.026
(-1.464)
-0.015
(-0.900)
-0.016
(-1.072)
-0.019
(-1.338)
-0.017
(-1.265)
-0.013
(-0.999)
-0.010
(-0.807)
-0.011
(-0.888)
-0.008
(-0.707)
0.000
(0.007)
M2 0.021*
(1.818)
0.008
(0.862)
0.002
(0.216)
0.003
(0.359)
0,003
(0.366)
0.002
(0.345)
0.002
(0.337)
0.004
(0.739)
0.006
(1.127)
0.008
(1.518)
0.007
(1.420)
0.009*
(1.770)
M2Y 0.024**
(2.009)
0.010
(0.970)
0.004
(0.468)
0.003
(0.323)
0.003
(0.387)
0.003
(0.457)
0.002
(0.357)
0.004
(0.726)
0.006
(1.073)
0.008
(1.460)
0.008
(1.436)
0.009*
(1.828)
Time Deposit Rate 0.003
(0.241)
0.342***
(3.733)
0.272***
(3.284)
0.230***
(2.998)
0.201***
(2.767)
0.177**
(2.562)
0.160**
(2.416)
0.143**
(2.244)
0.126**
(2.042)
0.118*
(1.969)
0.119**
(2.031)
0.108*
(1.884)
US Dollar Time Deposit Rate 0.054
(0.514)
0.321**
(3.925)
0.286***
(3.674)
0.236***
(3.139)
0.218***
(3.056)
0.219***
(3.221)
0.195***
(2.933)
0.178***
(2.772)
0.166***
(2.666)
0.155**
(2.562)
0.147**
(2.496)
0.144**
(2.513)
Treasury Bill Rate 0.040*
(1.881)
0.015
(0.761)
0.004
(0.249)
0.005
(0.329)
0.004
(0.261)
0.006
(0.443)
0.007
(0.514)
0.006
(0.464)
0.003
(0.212)
0.005
(0.400)
0.004
(0.329)
0.009
(0.808)
Real Treasury Bill Rate 0.044*
(1.713)
0.015
(0.659)
-0.003
(-0.149)
0.003
(0.134)
-0.001
(-0.053)
0.005
(0.316)
0.008
(0.479)
0.007
(0.467)
0.002
(0.167)
0.008
(0.527)
0.005
(0.346)
0.012
(0.882)
Interbank Rate -0.036
(-0.814)
-0.029
(-0.780)
-0.012
(-0.361)
-0.024
(-0.822)
-0.021
(-0.777)
-0.020
(-0.790)
-0.025
(-1.030)
-0.030
(-1.308)
-0.022
(-0.987)
-0.025
(-1.17.3)
-0.024
(-1.159)
-0.018
(-0.876)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note; The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on 
its lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C9- Hausm an F-Test Statistics for Inflation-O utput
di Cl2 di d4 ds di d7 ds d. dio du dp.
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI 9.895* 9.976* 9.869* 9.854* 9.915* 10.072* 10.322* 10.211* 10.072* 10.094* 10.191* 10.246*
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 2.124 2.000 1.937 2.103 2.630 2.600 2.747 2.793 2.869 2.955 3.139 3.191
Monthly Growth Rate of private WPI 2,715 3.064 1.949 2.049 2.742 2.642 2.714 2.688 2.806 2.868 2.903 2.747
Monthly Increase in Industrial 
Production Index
9.313* 9.158* 10.711* 10.035* 14.605* 14.216* 13.003* 13.584* 13.886* 10.092* 12.714* 9.149*
* indicates 1 % significance level.
Note; The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the Hausman statistics of the dummy variable in the column for the policy variable in the row.
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TABLE CIO - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Pre-Election Period via IV
di (l2 lb ih lb lb 1I7 ll8 1I9 ilio ilu 1I12
Monthly Grow th Rate of CPI -0.018
(-0.314)
0.003
(0.124)
-0.001
(-0.035)
-0.001
(-0.077)
-0.001
(-0.038)
-0.009
(-0.687)
-0.012
(-0.948)
-0.011
(-0.856)
-0.009
(-0.804)
-0.011
(-0.964)
-0.011
(-0.963)
-0.010
(-0.891)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.030
(0.373)
0.003
(0.104)
-0.003
(-0.133)
-0.007
(-0.292)
-0.005
(-0.244)
-0.007
(-0.341)
-0.002
(-0.120)
-0.004
(-0.199)
-0.003
(-0.181)
-0.004
(-0.186)
-0.004
(-0.189)
-0.003
(-0.125)
Monthly Grou'th Rate 
of private WPI
0.042
(0.SI2)
0.023
(0.865)
0.006
(0.223)
0.007
(0.309)
0.001
(0.038)
0.002
(0.099)
0.002
(0.164)
0.001
(0.041)
0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(-0.031)
0.000
(0.020)
-0.001
(-0.071)
Monthly Increase 
in Industrial Production Index
0.198*
(¡.868)
0.165
(1.614)
0.182*
(1.688)
0.176
(1.367)
0.261
(1.451)
0.303
(1.220)
0.363
(0.957)
0.294
(1.170)
0.344
(0.982)
0.214
(1.041)
0.241
(1.158)
0.191
(0.977)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on its 
lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C l l  - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Pre-Election Period via OLS
d d, d2 dj d4 ds ds d7 dg d. dio d„ dl2
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI -0.003
(^ 0,226)
-0.004
(-0.396)
-0.004
(-0.531)
-0.003
(-0.419)
-0.003
(-0.494)
-0.004
(-0.701)
-0.004
(-0.771)
-0.005
(-1.052)
-0.007
(-1.455)
-0.007
(-1.451)
-0.008*
(-1.673)
-0.007
(-1.656)
-0.006
(-1.429)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.001
(0.045)
0.000
(0.027)
0.001
(0.093)
0.001
(0.081)
-0.003
(-0.269)
-0.008
(-0.763)
-0.006
(-0.673)
-0.006
(-0.624)
-0.006
(-0.721)
-0.006
(-0.667)
-0.006 
(-0.790)
-0.007
(-0.884)
-0.007
(-0.891)
Monthly Growth Rate
of private WPI
0.003
(0.286)
0.000
(0.045)
-0.002
(-0.228)
0.001
(0.085)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.008
(-1.573)
-0.006
(-1.208)
-0.005
(-1.091)
-0.006
(-1.289)
-0.006
(-1.426)
-0.007
(-1.614)
-0.006
(-1.607)
-0.006
(-1.600)
Monthly Grow th Rate
of public WPI
-0.008
(-0.356)
-0.010
(-0.603)
-0.009
(-0.680)
-0.012
(-0.971)
-0.015
(-1.359)
-0.015
(-1.449)
-0.016*
(-1.729)
-0.015*
(-1.668)
-0.014
(-1.650)
-0.014*
(-1.681)
-0.016*
(-1.917)
-0.017**
(-2.190)
-0.017**
(-2.177)
Monthly Increase in
Industrial Production Index
0.047
(1.590)
0.044**
(2.053)
0,021
(1.214)
0.019
(1,216)
0.001
(0.059)
0.008
(0.642)
0.008
(0.706)
0,012
(1.069)
0.015
(1.359)
0.009
(0.901)
0.006
(0.588)
0.006
(0.638)
0.005
(0.545)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note; The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row' is regressed on its lags and 
on onlv the dummv in the column.
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TABLE C12 - Effects of Elections on Inflation-Output in the Post-Election Period
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dpr, dp7 dps dp» ilpio dpii dpi2
Monthly Growth Rate of CPI 0.002
(0.197)
0.000
(0.045)
0.003
(0.416)
0.006
(0.948)
0.008
(1.393)
0.005
(0.914)
0.000
(0.028)
-0.002
(-0.304)
-0.003
(-0.541)
-0.001
(-0.311)
-0.001
(-0.297)
-0.001 
(-0.314)
Monthly Growth Rate of WPI 0.017
(0.993)
0.015
(1.097)
0.021
(1.692)
-0.005
(-0.445)
0.000
(-0.009)
-0.001
(-0.124)
-0.004
(-0.386)
-0.005
(-0.589)
-0.005
(-0.595)
-0.004
(-0.510)
-0.003
(-0.424)
-0.003
(-0.400)
Monthly Growth Rate
of private WPI
0.011
(1.266)
0.006
(0.828)
0.008
(1.340)
0.010
(1.842)
0.008
(1.529)
0.005
(1.019)
0.003
(0.630)
0.002
(0.429)
0.002
(0.394)
0.002
(0.528)
0.002
(0.556)
0.002
(0.545)
Monthly Growth Rate
of public WPI
0.023
(1.434)
0.022
(1.607)
0.034***
(2.864)
0.034***
(3.067)
0.030***
(2.831)
0.024**
(2.337)
0.021**
(2.129)
0.019**
(2.054)
0.018**
(1.988)
0.016*
(1.920)
0.015*
(1.834)
0.012
(1.536)
Monthly Increase in
Industrial Production Index
0.019
(0.S75)
0.008
(0.436)
0.023
(1.407)
0.011
(0.734)
0.012
(0.876)
0.003
(0.233)
0.002
(0.184)
0.003
(0.286)
0.003
(0.256)
0.003
(0.303)
0.003
(0.257)
-0.001
(-0.078)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note: The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on its 
lags and on only the dummy in the column.
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TABLE C13 - Effects of Elections on Gap in the Pre and Post-Election Period
d, tl2 tl3 d4 ds da d7 d8 d9 tlio d „ d,2
Difference of Monthly Growth Rate
of Public and Private W P I
-0.006
(-0.501)
-0.003
(-0.247)
-0.007
(-0.743)
-0.008
(-1.027)
-0.004
(-0.493)
-0.009
(-1.252)
-0.009
(-1.310)
-0.008
(-1.320)
-0.008
(-1.280)
-0.009
(-1.460)
-0.010
(-1.696)
-0.007
(-1.318)
dpi dp2 dp3 dp4 dps dpa dp7 dp8 dp9 Jpio d pii dpi2
Difference of Monthly Growth Rate
of Public and Private W P I
0.011
(0.903)
0.013
(1.240)
0 .0 2 3 **
(2.510)
0 .0 2 1 **
(2.505)
0 .0 1 7 **
(2.218)
0 .014*
(1.855)
0 .013*
(1.812)
0 .012*
(1.773)
0 .012*
(1.783)
0.010
(1.643)
0 .011*
(1.761)
0.009
(1.541)
*** indicates 1 %, ** indicates 5 % and * indicates 10 % significance level.
Note; The number at the intersection of a row and a column is the coefficient of the dummy variable in the column, where the policy variable in the row is regressed on its lags and 
on onlv the dummy in the column.
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